

UNDP

**Working for
Solutions to Crisis:**

THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE

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I. Development and Crisis: A Continuing Challenge

The New Focus: Prevention and Post-Conflict Transition

The special problems of countries wracked by conflict and labouring towards an often uncertain peace have dominated the humanitarian and development scene in the 1990's. **Prevention and post-conflict transition** have moved development to centre stage in devising sustainable solutions to crisis. The topic is generating an extensive literature on the complex inter-relationship between relief, development and peace-building. How UNDP is contributing to this "new" development challenge is the purpose of this paper.

In 1995 UNDP recognized the need to provide better targeted and speedier development responses in such situations. What has been the experience to date? Two years are a short period when considered in the context of political accommodations, of economic recovery and of reconciling fragmented societies. Most projects have not yet run their full course and some have encountered serious delays following relapse into conflict. Conclusions can only be **tentative after so brief a time**.

The challenge of coming to grips with conflict and peace issues is not letting up. For aid agencies, it is a matter of improving the ways in which they respond to such crises, and there is therefore merit in examining methods and approaches as work proceeds. Setbacks but also **real achievements** are being recorded.

The wider backdrop to UNDP's own concern with these matters highlights their **critical importance** to the development community as a whole. In response to a ministerial meeting of the Security Council calling for a "comprehensive international effort" to promote peace and security in Africa, the Secretary-General reported in April 1998 on how to identify sources of crisis, how to resolve them, and lay the foundations for peace and economic growth. The question of how responsibilities for humanitarian relief and development action should be divided among the concerned United Nations agencies has been addressed in the measures now adopted for UN organizational reform.

At the DAC high-level meeting in May 1997, the development ministers of donor nations and other DAC members reached a **milestone consensus**, by agreeing on a set of guidelines for development cooperation where conflict prevention and peace-building are concerned. The DAC issued a joint policy statement on the principles and goals of international action, the role of development assistance in the

various phases of conflict, and made recommendations on the key actions donors should take.¹

There is general agreement that the elaboration of "best practices" is an **ongoing process**. No ready-made solutions exist when attempting to cope with the problems of societies prone to conflict or devastated by war. Each situation is unique. Increasingly, donors are aware that development cooperation cannot be the only remedy. Like humanitarian assistance, it must combine with other policy instruments available to the international community in the area of diplomacy and trade to be effective.

Tackling the Root Causes

To those immediately affected, natural calamities often strikingly **reveal the deficiencies** that exist in the way countries are equipped to provide urgent help to disaster victims and to deal with the aftermath of disaster. Emergencies are replete with the wisdom that comes with hindsight: if prevention and preparedness for disaster had been seriously addressed, its impact would have been less severe. Lives could have been saved and economic assets protected.

Such lessons provide opportunities for **action and redress**. Had development needs been addressed earlier, the solutions would have been more cost-effective. Almost invariably, projects that deal with the effects of disaster incorporate efforts to create permanent or more viable institutional arrangements to mitigate disaster impact.

Emergencies are also man-made, at times aggravated by climate adversities such as droughts or floods. Many escalate into violent conflict arising from a web of complex factors and relationships that are not always well understood. Many elements, such as social exclusion, economic injustice and poverty are of a developmental nature. They often stand out among the **root causes of the conflict**. It is important to analyse carefully all pertinent factors, for without an understanding of the origins of violence, there can be no effective remedy.

It is now generally accepted that rehabilitation and reconstruction do not mean that there should be a return to the status quo ante. The insights and lessons learned from crisis provide opportunities for constructive change and future reform. They are new points of departure on the path of innovation and sustainable development. Emergencies are often **springboards for progress**.

Two years ago UNDP reviewed its own record of the activities pursued in crisis countries over the last decade.² It found that more study was needed to

¹) DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, May 1997, DAC/OECD

accomplish better linkages between relief and development; it also noted that, over the years, UNDP emergency interventions, financed from its Special Programme Reserve (SPR), tended to fall into a **consistent pattern**. This went beyond helping to cope with the immediate logistics of aiding disaster victims, organizing disaster management training programmes, and carrying out post-crisis needs assessments.

Other initiatives, such as area rehabilitation to resettle uprooted populations, the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, mine action, capacity-building within government institutions, and the organising of national elections, widened the scope and **claimed an increasing share** of UNDP's attention.

Box 1: A New Resource Window for Crisis Countries

In late 1995, UNDP's Executive Board introduced new programming arrangements for UNDP core resources. Part of these resources, **5 per cent or about \$37.5 million yearly**, were set aside for countries facing "special development situations", to be allocated over and above other resources to which they were eligible. The funding channel for special development initiatives was named TRAC 1.1.3.

The Emergency Response Division (ERD) is the in-house mechanism set up to provide a quicker and more effective response in emergency situations. Acting on requests received from resident coordinators, resources are assigned under **simplified procedures** through the Crisis Committee. This body functions as a cross-divisional working group of UNDP's Programme Management Oversight Committee (PMOC). To start with, the latter must assign "special development situation status" to a given country, in order for it to qualify for TRAC 1.1.3 funding.

Funds are **quickly released** to ensure that activities can be launched on the basis of brief submissions describing the purpose of the project, pending the elaboration of a more detailed project document, which is then appraised and approved in the regular manner.

The Crisis Committee is chaired by the Associate Administrator or in his absence by the Director of ERD, which services the Committee's business. By meeting weekly and streamlining the approval process, UNDP has been able to expedite its support for reconstruction and peace-building, and on the organizational level, to strengthen the United Nations resident coordinator system.

²⁾ Building Bridges Between Relief and Development: A Compendium of the UNDP Record in Crisis

In several cases, projects are implemented under new direct execution arrangements by the UNDP field offices, often in partnership with NGO's, and this has in turn helped to bring projects speedily from the drawing-board to action in the field.

On this basis, UNDP interventions were categorized in a logical funding structure, the first (Category I) being devoted to strategic approaches to deal with complex development situations and special programme initiatives within such strategies, the second (Category II) providing immediate responses to sudden crises, and a third (Category III) dealing with capacity-building to avoid or prepare for crisis.

In practice, projects and programmes did not always fit into neat categories of this kind. The project documentation reveals a multiplicity of local conditions and **differences of approach and emphasis** in tackling national problems. And in many cases programmes were multipurpose in nature.

For example, special initiatives undertaken to further a given strategy for national action may be devoted in part or in whole to building capacity to avoid or prepare for future emergencies. The Agricultural Relief and Rehabilitation Programme in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the community-based Rehabilitation of Forest Areas and Disaster Management in Mongolia are instances of such **multipurpose programmes**.

As for programmes designed to develop strategic approaches, the operational concepts are still evolving. Strategy development involves not only policy analysis and the formulation of frameworks for recovery, but - as in the case of Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority - capacity-building for planning and for **field-testing different methodologies**, so that recipients can assume responsibility for and ownership of all essential actions taken. Other exercises in strategy formulation, such as those undertaken for Rwanda and the Republic of Yemen, focus on **programme identification and preparation**, as well as on providing the rationale for resource mobilisation through United Nations appeals and donor consultative groups.

Guiding Principles

As a matter of coordinating approaches, a set of basic principles have evolved in consultation with other aid agencies and concerned institutions having similar development experience. While not formally adopted, these principles are often referred to and guide UNDP operations in crisis countries.

- ◆ **Working towards structural stability.** The quest for peace and sustainable human development is unlikely to be successful unless the forces that have produced tensions and violent conflict are brought under control in a climate of social and political accommodation, where human rights are respected and where aspirations for social and economic change are broadly shared. Essentially, support should be directed to political institutions and practices that enable society to manage change without allowing disputes to escalate into violence.
- ◆ **Recognizing the relief/development linkage.** At whatever stage of crisis, whether before, during or after open conflict, work to sustain livelihoods must be pursued as vigorously as life-saving endeavours. Throughout a crisis, opportunities for rehabilitation and reconstruction coexist with acute relief needs. Preventive measures can be taken not only before crisis erupts, but also to forestall the recurrence of an emergency. When the emergency is over, it is in most cases essential that relief work is not unduly extended, is forward-looking and does not create dependencies that compromise simultaneous development action.
- ◆ **Protecting development gains.** Both man-made and natural disasters can seriously set back or even eliminate hard-won development gains. Preventing reversals is the central purpose of prevention initiatives, such as those taken in support of improved governance and community participation in decision-making processes. As regards natural disasters, mitigation and preparedness activities should be an integral part of national development strategies and plans. A culture of disaster mitigation and training for heightened preparedness needs to be fostered in all national institutions concerned. _
- ◆ **Giving primacy to the country perspective.** In reality, and in substantive terms, the role of headquarters is secondary. Developing countries are themselves responsible for their development, and this holds true also for countries in crisis, even when the national government apparatus is crippled. To the extent initiatives are taken by donors, under the leadership of the resident coordinator, they must be sanctioned by local authorities, whether in the form of a central government or at the regional or community level. Headquarters can only play a support role.
- ◆ **Adopting a strategic approach.** Given the diverse political and social environments and the complex factors that have led to violent conflict and collapse of governance, it is essential to begin with a penetrating analysis of root causes of the break-down and of the road map towards a new order. The analysis should not uniquely be a UNDP exercise, but should be elaborated jointly with the government, other United Nations agencies and major donors, and lead to a comprehensive framework for recovery taking into account the national and regional context, and defining the nature and scope of international action.

- ◆ **Building national capacity.** A fundamental objective must always be to create or improve national institutions and capacities to deal with the effects of disaster. Natural calamities or open political conflict cannot always be predicted, but better preparation for adversity and mitigation of the impact of disaster are in general achievable.
- ◆ **Reinforcing in-country coordination.** A heavy burden falls on the resident/humanitarian coordinators in countries experiencing distress, as their offices are often not equipped to tackle effectively the many additional tasks involved. A first concern must be to ensure that staff capacities both in the government and resident coordinators' offices are appropriately strengthened and given adequate technical support.

Resource Use Overview

- ◆ Resource allocations for “development in countries in special situations” (TRAC 1.1.3)³ have been made since mid-1996. However the bulk of allocations feature in project budgets for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999.
- ◆ As of December 1998, resources have been allocated for some 200 projects totalling **over \$130 million**. Of these \$106 million of projects have been approved and are in various stages of implementation.
- ◆ The bulk of these resources (80 per cent) have been assigned under Category I, for special programme initiatives, as well as for assistance strategies/strategic frameworks. Resources have been allocated from this category for 93 projects in 39 countries as well as for 4 sub-regional and 3 inter-regional projects and for the Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP).
- ◆ Categories II, Sudden Crisis - Immediate Response, has received 7 per cent of allocated resources, to fund 68 coordination related projects in 51 countries. Category III, Capacity-building, accounts for the balance (13 per cent) of current resource allocations. This has enabled the funding of 21 projects at the country level, 3 at the regional level, 5 at the inter-regional level, and 1 global project. Allowance should be made for the fact that many Category I projects are multipurpose and in many instances also embrace activities in other categories.

³) TRAC: Target for Resource Assignments from the Core. TRAC 1.1.1 represents the established planning figure for each country receiving UNDP support. TRAC 1.1.2 covers supplementary funding to countries that have made effective use of prior allocations and can demonstrate the need for additional support. TRAC 1.1.3 is earmarked for countries in “special development situations”.

- ◆ TRAC 1.1.3 resource allocations have accordingly been made to some 185 projects in 75 countries as well as to 4 sub-regional, 3 regional, 7 inter-regional, 1 global projects, and to the PAPP. It should be noted however that more than 50 per cent of the value of all allocations are accounted for by only 12 countries., 75 per cent are accounted for by 22 countries, and 90 per cent are accounted for by 33 countries.
- ◆ In terms of the regional distribution of TRAC 1.1.3 resources allocations to date, **Africa** has received 25 per cent; **Asia and the Pacific and Europe** 20 per cent; the **CIS** 19 per cent; the **Arab States** (including PAPP) 16 per cent, **Latin America and the Caribbean** 15 per cent; and global and inter-regional projects received 5 per cent.
- ◆ With regard to the recipient countries about 55 per cent of resources have been allocated to countries officially designated as least developed (LDC's), and approximately 68 per cent to low income countries.

Mobilising More Resources

Clearly UNDP resources alone **are insufficient** for the tasks at hand. In many cases they constitute seed money designed to attract further international contributions to specific undertakings.

The focus on strategic approaches takes on particular significance in this regard. A valid strategic framework is not only an **indispensable guide** for UN system organizations when programmes are considered and approved, but also for agencies working bilaterally. Such policy frameworks for recovery have substantial value as a ready reference for the many multilateral and bilateral missions that visit countries in crisis.

While not intended primarily as fund-raising documents, frameworks for recovery focus the discussion on policy issues and can therefore serve to give programme coherence to appeals for resources, whether through the inter-agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), or through documentation presented to Round Table (RT) meetings and Consultative Group (CG) conferences.

CAPs are especially important for countries that are in the throes of crisis or begin to emerge from conflict in that programmes for which support is requested can from the outset help **reconcile the built-in separation** between relief and development, at the donor end and as a result of the conventional focus on agency mandates. It is because relief action and development work are inseparable in the real world that humanitarian appeals for complex emergencies have increasingly been expanded to include activities devoted to rehabilitation and recovery. Similarly, Round

Tables record needs associated with rehabilitation and reintegration, and not just development.

The use of “special development” resources to provide governments and resident coordinator offices with the **necessary technical support** and to strengthen the inter-agency Disaster Management Teams (DMT) is designed to produce policy frameworks and CAPs that are ultimately intended to raise additional resources. CAPs are particularly appropriate fund-raising instruments where trust funds are set up and managed by a multilateral agency, but are also useful for donors where parallel funding through NGOs is the preferred route for international assistance.

In order to augment resources made available to crisis countries, UNDP has established a central trust fund open to donors wishing to make contributions, general or project-specific, in support of social and economic recovery. The Government of Italy has played a key role in launching the trust fund by making a first contribution of over \$28 million for programmes under way in Bosnia, Central America and Mozambique. Interventions in Angola, Cuba and South Africa are also planned.

Other trust funds are country-specific. In **Rwanda**, for instance, UNDP is managing a trust fund that in less than two years received contributions totalling more than \$100 million for a variety of projects related to the reintegration of refugees and to governance. It is obvious that programming, project delivery, and monitoring of **the use of resources** of this order can only be undertaken if the resident coordinator’s office is strengthened and enabled to engage expeditiously NGO’s in the implementation of the programme. The **Angola** Trust Fund has raised \$31 in the same period.

The purpose of mobilizing resources is also served in other ways. An established arrangement is cost-sharing where third-party financing is integrated with UNDP funding. In the **Philippines**, the project devoted to the reintegration of MNLF⁴ ex-combatants has drawn in cost-sharing contributions from four countries in the amount of \$630,000 and set a target for associated funding of reintegration programmes at \$10 million. Four projects in **Bosnia/Herzegovina**, financed under TRAC 1.1.3, have attracted cost-sharing, trust fund and parallel contributions which have multiplied ten-fold the resources made available to reintegrate displaced people and create an economic and social basis for resurrected communities.

In other situations, allocations are not so much to spearhead bilateral contributions as to provide a supportive, **catalytic or management environment** for an existing trust fund or for parallel financing. This applies for instance in the case of

⁴) MNLF: Mindanao National Liberation Front

II. Working for Durable Solutions to Crisis

Framing the Strategies

Conceptually, strategies can be wide or narrow, all-embracing or selective, but in general a strategy attempts to articulate and structure policies designed to shape operations in any given situation and to reach specific goals.

By extension, a strategic framework or framework of assistance for recovery tries to **explain why specific policies**, whether advocated or already adopted, are necessary in a given context. In practice strategic frameworks and policy formulations vary considerably in content and form. Much effort has been spent trying to define how such policy frameworks for recovery in a crisis country should be structured, probably an elusive enterprise in view of the variety of situations that arise. However, in most cases it is agreed that as a minimum a policy framework should attempt to:

- make an in-depth analysis of the situation and identify the underlying political, economic and social determinants of the crisis;
- discuss the goals to be pursued and the policies that orient the road map towards normalization, rehabilitation and recovery;
- describe the programme responses and operational modalities called for, assessing political and economic risks, and defining the prerequisites of success;
- provide the context and the logic for a rational allocation of resources, domestic and external, destined for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction;
- identify political factors affecting governance and economic management;

- devise exit arrangements for forms of direct support that risk creating dependencies;
- engage the participation of the principal stakeholders and reflect a broad consensus between the government, major donors and implementing agencies.

It follows that strategy frameworks are not operational plans seeking resources for specific programme elements. Rather, it is a statement of the policies and situational factors that should inform the overall programme and any fund-raising documents prepared for the consideration of donors.

Looked at in this way, it is clear that the formulation of a framework for recovery is an ongoing process, and that the product of this process is a living document whose specifics are subject to review and change over time. The policy framework hence becomes a **primary instrument of coordination** for the government and for the donor community. Having participated in the process, donors are usually confident in supporting the principles and approaches recommended.

So far allocations for launching a strategic framework process have been made to six countries: Afghanistan, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Yemen and Tajikistan, to one regional grouping (Horn of Africa) and to the Palestinian Authority. As most of these allocations are of relatively recent date, it is too early to draw any firm conclusions from these exercises.

Allocations can be made up to a maximum amount of \$500,000, and it is up to the resident coordinator to determine which agencies should be associated with the process on a regular basis and to assess how the resources at his/her disposal can best be applied to advance the process. In many cases, like **Rwanda**, it is necessary to inject a substantial **increase of staff and consultancy resources** to make it possible for the resident coordinator's office to carry out the necessary research work and other preparations in a credible manner.

Similarly, as in the case of the **Palestinian Authority**, resources are used to create a **development planning capacity**, without which it could not act as an equal partner in the formulation of strategic plans, let alone claim ownership of the process. This institutional capacity will be directed towards elaborating and monitoring development plans and investment programmes.

The lack of a recognized central authority and the **quasi-governmental role** aid agencies have played in **Afghanistan** render the need for coordination and consensus among them more pressing than ever. The strategic framework process has been the primary tool for this coordination and for making it possible to elaborate a

more adequate international response to the Afghan crisis. This response had been found wanting in many ways, particularly in devising an over-arching political strategy to end the conflict, human rights abuses and gender discrimination. Selected as a formal pilot exercise, wide and intensive consultations among aid agencies and national stakeholders were set in motion in 1997; a workshop was held, several missions fielded, and paper and drafts discussed, to build consensus and prepare a strategic framework document, around which **all interested parties could rally**.

Although Afghanistan remains a country in continuing conflict, the work on producing a strategic framework for international assistance has now been completed. Having elaborated a set of basic principles and ground rules governing international action, it calls for the enactment of a political/human rights strategy and a parallel humanitarian/development assistance strategy, defining the objectives of both. In institutional terms, the strategic framework creates steering mechanisms at headquarters and at the field level; it establishes a joint programming entity comprising all interested organizations, called the Afghanistan Programming Board, also setting up independent monitoring machinery. These arrangements are designed to ensure that political action and assistance projects are coherent and mutually reinforcing, with common programme priorities directed at creating and sustaining livelihoods, at alleviating wide-spread poverty and providing a basic linkage with the peace-building effort.

The same search for consensus - under the aegis of a policy framework - has been instituted in **Somalia** among warring factions, UN agencies, bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations. Several workshops have been held, bringing together a wide range of actors, in order to **establish what works best** in an unplanned environment, devising joint programmes and creating common services.

Special Development Initiatives

In virtually all complex emergencies, the road map towards recovery - whether or not formalized in a policy framework document - will milestone peace and social justice **as paramount goals** of national and international action. The objective of peace, be it close at hand, elusive or remote, and the strategies leading towards peace, need to be buttressed by a set of simultaneous policy and operational initiatives.

Some of these initiatives, military, diplomatic or trade, lie outside the scope of humanitarian aid or development cooperation. Relief and development, on the other hand, are very much **part of the mandates** of the organizations of the United Nations system. While relief and development assistance is often taken up by bilateral aid agencies directly and separately, it is also pursued jointly, under co-financing arrangements, with multilateral organizations.

The following areas of intervention, which feature in programmes supported by UNDP, have in common that they are all **part of the need to create a basis for stability and peace**, in the preventive sense of eschewing violence and by way of providing a cure after conflict has taken place. The list is by no means exhaustive:

- good governance, judicial systems and observance of human rights
- support for national or local elections
- resettlement and reintegration of uprooted populations
- area development and action at the community level
- reintegration of demobilized soldiers
- mine action
- improved food security
- protection of the environment
- rebuilding physical infrastructure

Special initiatives that receive funding from TRAC 1.1.3 are frequently multipurpose in the sense that they deal with a particular facet of peace-building. Interventions in the area of governance, in particular, are often combined with action at the community level, such as in **Afghanistan, Georgia and Tajikistan**, or concerned with creating usable platforms for national reconciliation, as in the **Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines**.

Box 3: Peace-building in Central America

The nexus between peace-building and people-centered development is readily apparent in **three regional programmes in Central America** aiming at transparency in governance, at consolidating democratic institutions and at empowering local government. Past upheavals have long been ascribed to the marginalisation of large segments of society, and despite the progress made, regionally and at the political level, the root causes of conflict have proved intractable and persistent.

Armed confrontations in the past were a constant source of instability, but it is increasingly clear that poverty and continued social exclusion loom ominously over the future. The predicament of a large number of citizens, some 15 million, is **actually deteriorating**. Every second Central American lacks access to basic social services; training and employment opportunities are scarce; many are excluded from the political processes and there is widespread distrust of political institutions.

With the peace process faltering or at a critical stage, one cannot discount the possibility of conflict flaring up once more. The three projects, as well as national projects in Guatemala and El Salvador, attempt to **give prevention and peace-building a chance**. One project is designed to provide renewed impetus to a strategy of sustainable human development at the local level; another is to prepare regular

human development reports providing complete and accurate information to civil society on the situation in each of the Central American countries and on regional integration efforts, to improve official credibility; and a third project provides support to national or regional institutions and non-governmental bodies, by helping them contribute to consensus-building and reconciliation through workshops, meetings and publications.

Prevention also features prominently in the allocations made to **Bulgaria** whose economic crisis coupled with structural adjustment efforts is having **grave social and political** consequences, with the country hovering on collapse. The project focus is on establishing national and provincial early warning systems and on mustering international support to alleviate the social impact of economic adjustment and to create a capacity to deal with a prospective emergency.

◆ **Good governance, judicial systems and human rights.** About 20 of the projects approved under Category I (ii) for special programme initiatives are devoted to restoring or improving systems and institutions of governance, including in the judicial area and support to organizations committed to the observance of human rights.

The types of assistance are as varied and diverse as the countries receiving support and range from actions of limited duration and scope to more ambitious ventures. In **Mali**, long shaken by the Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country, the project **focus is on security** and the collection of light arms, as well as on relations between civil and military authorities with a view to instituting, at relatively little cost, an ongoing dialogue to improve understanding between the military on the one hand and the political parties and civil society on the other.

The allocation to **Rwanda** has a wider sweep. It reinforces the capacity in the government and the resident coordinator's office to initiate and oversee a large number of projects, particularly involving returning refugees and their host communities, improvements to the judicial system, better and more humane prisons, the manning of the courts and training of law enforcement personnel, **all vital prerequisites** to any new national dispensation.

Security issues are often in the forefront of concerns when countries embark on the path to recovery. **Haiti** is a case in point and is the beneficiary of a \$2.2 million allocation to help train a professional police force, supportive of **democratic institutions** and sensitive to the observance of human rights.

National institutions, recovering from varying degrees of disruption or even anarchy, are often unable to undertake the nuts and bolts work related to programme identification and preparation, unaided. Thus, some of the support dedicated to

governance and institutional development is devoted to **programme preparation**, including the provision of project management inputs. The projects approved for **Haiti** for the integration of vulnerable groups and for greater regional integration in the Caribbean zone are of this order; the area development endeavour in **Bosnia/Herzegovina** to rebuild local capacities is likewise in this group, aiming as it does to mobilize additional resources for greater programme impact.

The programme in **Mozambique** serves the aim of sound governance more indirectly. By developing research and information systems and relating them to events of past emergencies, it attempts to identify what **lessons have been learned** from its national experience and how they remain relevant to the present reconstruction effort, both for local government actors, civil society and the international community.

◆ **Support for national and local elections.** While not a panacea for peace, stability or democratic growth, elections are an important milestone in establishing the political legitimacy of successor governments and in creating new relationships between the authorities and the citizenry. In many situations, there is a demand for assistance in conducting popular consultations and in monitoring the polls and their outcome.

This type of assistance is tailored to individual requirements and ranges from basic material support, as in the case of **Djibouti**, to the provision of advisory services and the funding of training programmes for the staff of election commissions and other officials concerned with voter registration, relations with the media and the conduct of the actual balloting, as in the **Republic of Yemen**, which in 1997 held its first national elections since the civil war.

Similar support was provided for the local elections in **Haiti**, which took place after considerable delay in mid-1997, with the additional proviso that the UNDP project help coordinate and channel all international support provided to make the elections a success.

A **coordination role** for external support for the electoral process, along with the preparation of a detailed, costed plan for the forthcoming national and communal elections, is also part of the project effort in **Cambodia**. Massive assistance was provided by the international community to organize the first national elections in 1993 during the United Nations transitional administration, and nothing on that scale was contemplated for the elections in mid-1998. Advisory services were however provided, with emphasis placed on training electoral officials and on securing the involvement of civil society, especially women's groups, in voter education and monitoring.

A substantial contribution was approved for **Liberia**, where it was a matter of restoring government services to the point where elections could be held at all. To accomplish this, the project strategy was to identify, recruit and support logistically, available Liberian professionals to undertake short-term operational assignments **essential to the functioning** of the government, while international advisers were fielded to work in key government departments at the policy level.

◆ **Resettlement and reintegration of uprooted populations.** Almost all complex emergencies, and also some natural disasters, are accompanied by population displacements and by the sometimes massive movement of refugees across national frontiers. The path to recovery and development begins with their return to their areas of origin; the rebuilding of a peaceful society cannot be achieved without their successful reintegration in their home communities.

A number of allocations have been approved for the purpose of facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced people, including relief measures and the rehabilitation of basic social services. The needs usually go well beyond what can be covered by UNDP; in most situations it **provides seed money** for a much larger effort on the part of the international community. In **Sri Lanka**, for instance, where about 400,000 displaced civilians have returned to the Jaffna Peninsula, resources have been applied to set up a common UN logistics centre to provide local support services (communications, transport and accommodation) to other UN agencies and to bilateral donors active in the area, offering on-site liaison with local national entities.

Box 4: Reintegrating displaced returnees in Azerbaijan

The conflict over the Nakorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan caused significant damage to physical infrastructure, cultural monuments and private housing and led to the displacement of close to a million people. When the cease-fire agreement was signed, the first priority for Azerbaijan was to assist IDPs to return to their homes, as a first step in restoring peace in the area.

UNDP took the lead in starting up a rehabilitation programme for returnees in war-torn areas, coordinating support from other external donors, with an initial contribution of \$2 million, and by conducting systematic damage surveys. The World Bank and the European Union have been enlisted as partners, rebuilding communities ravaged by war and laying the groundwork for social and economic development.

A national agency, the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of War-torn Areas in Azerbaijan (ARRA) was created to manage the resettlement of returnees. The first wave of returnees numbered 8,000, and though relatively small,

opened the gate; their reintegration has been facilitated by the active participation of the communities involved and through income generating projects. In the next phase, a mine clearance programme is proposed, along with the drafting of an official national resettlement programme.

In the case of the **Republic of the Congo** resources were made available to gear up the concerned agencies of the government to prepare them for a possible and massive influx of refugees from neighbouring Zaire and to monitor more closely the movement of refugee groups from the Great Lakes region. Similar **contingency considerations** in part underlie the allocation to **Burundi** to monitor the situation of close to half a million internally displaced people in the rural areas and returnees from Zaire, as well as to cope with the essential needs of any populations able to return home before the civil war comes to an end.

Significant institutional and technical support was provided to help handle the massive return of refugees in **Rwanda**, to facilitate the overall planning and monitoring of resettlement and reintegration, and to design and oversee the implementation of quick impact programmes in priority areas, financed in large part from the UNDP trust fund for Rwanda.

The need for close operational contact between UNHCR and UNDP in Rwanda led to the creation, under the provisions of a MoU signed by the two organizations in March 1997, of a **Joint Reintegration Programming Unit**, with which WFP has also been associated. Over the past 18 months, the Unit has successfully consolidated the reintegration programmes of the two agencies and followed up on earlier initiatives possessing development potential. In particular, attention has been paid to developing sustainable livelihoods, diversifying and expanding the agricultural and non-agricultural base of rural households.

Projects are sometimes designed to cover very specific requirements, such as in the programme for the integrated resettlement in the central **Bosnian canton** of Travnik, co-financed by the European Union to the tune of over \$4.7 million. The damaged homes of 520 displaced families will be rehabilitated, freeing up the temporary accommodation they have used for an equal number of returnees from countries in Western Europe. The reintegration of both groups is facilitated by employment retraining, access to credit and small financial grants to the most needy.

- ◆ **Area development and action at the community level.** Interventions dealing comprehensively with the problems of local communities in most cases arise from programmes to assist the reintegration of displaced populations. The return of refugees and displaced people place a heavy burden on the resources of host

communities. In the interest of reconciliation, it is important that the inevitable strains of accommodating returnees are contained by giving local residents and returnees equal treatment. The community focus of area development provides special opportunities to enhance the role of women and to strengthen reconciliation among different ethnic groups.

In financial terms, area rehabilitation and development schemes require **considerable resources** and a local technical staff establishment to administer the various programme components. Area development schemes accordingly include provisions for a management element as well as a technical capability to help prepare small-scale, community-driven projects in the production and social sectors that can be funded through cost-sharing contributions or parallel interventions by other donors.

Thus in **Southern Lebanon**, which has suffered severe destruction of private housing and disruption of economic and social systems, as well as displacement, the **project's first purpose** is to formulate a post-crisis rehabilitation programme. Focusing initially on the UNIFIL area and the Tyr pocket, the project is already drawing on cost-sharing contributions from Ireland, Netherlands and the AGFUND to restore basic public services and revive economic activity, particularly in the agricultural sector.

The installation of an **operational framework** and technical capacity, with programming undertaken by mixed government/civil society municipal development committees, to manage anticipated trust fund contributions on a significant scale has been the first preoccupation of the programme approved for **Bosnia/Herzegovina**. Emergency rehabilitation of public infrastructure and housing has been carried out, and a portfolio of municipal projects worth \$7 million submitted for funding by the Government of Japan. One of the first initiatives taken was to elaborate an Atlas of Local Communities, with comprehensive socio-economic information on each municipality, for dissemination among donor agencies to facilitate **decision-making on investments**.

Community-driven, self-help approaches of necessity make up the participatory and decentralized programme in **Tajikistan** and in **Afghanistan**, where activities have been initiated in 23 rural and 6 urban districts, targeting improved local government and empowerment of civil society and placing particular emphasis on the **needs of women and the most disadvantaged**. The project has extensive experience to build on: the successful Afghanistan rural rehabilitation programme, which has run for many years.

◆ **Reintegration of demobilized soldiers.** Stability in a society emerging from armed conflict is uncertain if former combatants on both sides of the confrontation

are not reinserted in civilian life. The reintegration of demobilized soldiers is a costly proposition, and outside assistance is often necessary to provide opportunities for training, employment and a new start.

Whereas the cantonment of soldiers and their demobilization are usually seen as a short-term military affair, integration into civilian life can be time-consuming and arduous. Severance payments, with targeted assistance in the fields of **vocational training and employment creation**, are generally put in place to ease the transition. The passage to civilian life remains difficult, as in most cases the economy is in a state of stagnation allowing little space for the absorption of new job-seekers.

As most of the demobilized soldiers are youths or adult men, there is an important gender dimension to their reintegration. Programmes should target not only the former soldiers but also their families and host communities, the household being the basic unit of reintegration allowing women and other household members to play a role in the reconciliation process.

The largest reintegration effort is the programme in **Angola** for soldiers numbering over 100,000 to be demobilized from both the government forces and the rebel movement. The programme whose total cost is estimated at \$26 million has centered on a national institute specifically created to manage the reintegration of ex-military personnel, a **counselling and referral service** with branch offices in each province, and an employment generating fund to support small-scale projects developed by NGO's and other organized groups.

The main risk involved in projects for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers is that the peace process stalls and that the **actual demobilization is halted**. This has in fact been a recurrent feature of the Angolan project leading to several revisions of the time-table for the reintegration work. With less than 40,000 soldiers demobilized and with even lower participation in the reintegration programme, the demobilization programme has been suspended for the time being.

In the **Philippines**, resources have been used to supplement regular UNDP funding to set up a **project management and delivery** organization as well as to make a needs assessment for the benefit of ex-MNLF personnel who will not be integrated in the armed forces, some 70,000 former combatants. Project work is well under way; an assistance package targeting the creation of jobs and livelihoods and to meet basic needs, has been developed and initiated in 6 pilot communities on the island of Mindanao, which has some of the poorest provinces in the country.

The number of soldiers, loyalists and mutineers, is relatively small in the **Central African Republic**, no more than 1,000, but their successful return to civilian pursuits is considered an essential element of the transition from crisis. The project

operates on four fronts, through a demobilization package, a referral service, vocational training and on promoting employment prospects.

Using the same approaches to reintegration, UNDP seed money helped secure almost \$10 million in extra funding for **Guatemala**, a crucial element in ensuring the most **successful demobilization exercise** to date within the Central American peace process. All aspects of the initial demobilization were realized without delay in a spirit of cooperation between the former insurgents (URNG), the government and the international community. Training and job insertion programmes have been designed and launched.

◆ **Mine Action.** The removal of land mines is another operational priority in many countries that have experienced civil war. Apart from the human suffering caused by land mines, their presence is a major obstacle to normalization and the resumption of economic activity in many areas. Land mine clearance is a long-term and costly affair, and can usually not be successfully undertaken without external assistance. In most cases, it is necessary to create a national capacity to carry out clearance operations on the ground and set up national institutional and coordinating mechanisms.

Considerable progress has been made in securing an international ban on the manufacture and trade in anti-personnel land mines. Millions of land mines however have to be removed before this scourge of modern warfare, with its toll on innocent civilians, is **relegated to history**. Urgent mine clearance work is often started in the course of United Nations peace-keeping operations, by the UN and by NGO's that specialize not only in the physical rehabilitation of mine accident victims but also in conducting mine awareness campaigns, in marking mine fields and in carrying out actual mine clearance operations.

The creation of **national capacity** to deal with all aspects of mine action, including its social and political ramifications, and to coordinate international support for these institution-building activities, has become the hallmark of UNDP's contribution. Several requests are pending for assistance in coping with the land mine threat, from Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, and Iran; substantial grants have already been made to Cambodia, Chad, Laos, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

In **Laos**, the challenge is to free the country from the unexploded residue of aerial and mortar bombardment dating back more than 25 years. As a first step, a survey of the extent of contamination of unexploded ordnance was carried out to establish a data base, which could be progressively updated and help set priorities for the clearance programme. The next step has involved formal and on-the-job training of Lao personnel and the development of national capacity to manage community awareness

and operational programmes: as of mid-1997, clearance teams had visited some 600 villages in four provinces and **destroyed over 35,000 unexploded devices** located above and underground.

The mine action programme in Cambodia, already led and coordinated by a national institution, CMAC (Cambodian Mine Action Centre), is now well established. Given the scale of mine contamination in the country, it will for a long time depend on

outside support. This is coordinated by UNDP, whose contribution for the 1996-98 phase of CMAC's operations is designed to ensure the **continued viability and quality** of clearance activities over the next few years, and to see that sustained international support is provided in a framework allowing priority support to returnees and development action within a planned economic and social environment.

◆ **Rebuilding physical infrastructure.** Many installations providing basic necessities such as power and water supply, school buildings and health clinics may need urgent rehabilitation in order to function. The visible destruction of infrastructure and housing is a strong and ever-present reminder of crisis, and their reconstruction is an equally powerful symbol of the return to normal. Many governments therefore give priority to this work.

Although few projects funded from TRAC 1.1.3 are exclusively devoted to the rebuilding of infrastructure, several projects incorporate components concerned with the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure. This is for instance the case with the project in **Lebanon**, which focuses on reinvigorating agricultural production in the south, but which also calls attention to damaged installations of various kinds and to households whose housing has suffered damage from air attacks.

In **Azerbaijan**, within the framework of actions designed to facilitate the return of displaced populations, the project is promoting the manufacture or supply of essential building materials for private housing or rehabilitation components for community structures, small pedestrian and vehicle bridges and minor irrigation works, to be carried out on a self-help basis.

Similarly, in two districts of **Albania**, as part of the attempt to create a climate for normalization and recovery focusing on job creation and the revival of economic activity, resources in the amount of \$2 million were earmarked for the repair of damaged infrastructure concerned with the delivery of public and social services, such as schools, primary health care posts and sewage installations. The programme is now almost completed. Using local contractors, some 20 infrastructure items have been successfully repaired.

Physical **rehabilitation of health and educational infrastructure** is the principal objective of two projects in **Bosnia/Herzegovina**, which have carried out architectural studies for 18 primary schools and detailed designs for 3 additional schools, on an emergency basis, to permit early financing of construction with World Bank loans. Construction site assessments and architectural designs have been completed for over 100 health facilities to support the government's war victims rehabilitation programme.

Responding to Sudden Emergencies

When emergency erupts without warning, natural or man-made, the TRAC 1.1.3 facility, Category II, Sudden Crisis - Immediate Response, allows resident coordinators to react speedily to an emergency by making available up to \$100,000 to **help coordinate response activities**, without prior approval from headquarters. Resident coordinators only need to provide a standard disaster situation report, briefly indicate the intended use of the funds, and obligate expenditures within 30 days.

Over 44 resident coordinators have made use of this facility in response to over 50 crises/disasters, including political turmoil and sudden displacements of population groups; earthquakes; hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons; drought and floods caused by the El Nino phenomenon; and technological disasters such as oil-spills.

In **Myanmar, Azerbaijan and the Seychelles**, severe flooding triggered allocations under Category II to provide logistic support for the transportation of relief supplies and urgently needed equipment to assist disaster victims and to make assessments of the damage and essential repair of infrastructure. In south-eastern **Madagascar**, hit by a destructive tropical cyclone, sudden crisis assistance was used to strengthen the national agency concerned in providing early relief to the stricken populations.

Seasonal rain failures and drought in 1997, ascribed to effects of the El Nino phenomenon, make it virtually certain that food shortages will arise in eastern and southern Africa. Allocations have been made for **Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe** to help establish information and reporting systems, prepare contingency plans and generally to improve existing coordination mechanisms for providing relief.

As for man-made emergencies, the massive return of refugees and the need to collect reliable information on the movement of refugees and displaced people has prompted allocations for **Rwanda** and the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**. In **Albania** and **Bulgaria**, the need to create from scratch coordinating offices having at their disposal a reliable data base and able to manage the emergencies, at its various stages, has been a clear priority.

Mitigation and assessment of the short and long-term environmental impact of the large oil spill that occurred in early 1997 off the coast of **Uruguay** represented an immediate need that could be met by a Category II allocation. A series of measures could be taken to control the spread of oil slicks, protect beaches and marine life, train national staff in monitoring and follow-up work, as well as to evaluate the economic fall-out of the disaster.

In **Belarus**, the passage of a destructive hurricane in mid-1997 resulted in eye-opening awareness that its Crisis Management Centre was ill-equipped to deal with any natural or man-made disasters. The existence of nuclear energy plants across its borders, of gas and oil installations, pipelines, peat processing and chemical industries, threatened by recurring peat and forest fires, make the country high-risk and all have accident potential.

To strengthen the Centre funds have been made available for study tours to similar establishments in Poland and the Russian Federation and to hold a workshop led by an international specialist in risk control, information management and coordination. In addition, sophisticated computer equipment has been provided to the Centre.

Building National Capacity

The building of national capacity to avoid if possible and, if not possible, to prepare for and manage or mitigate the effects of crisis is at the heart of allocations made under Category III. The programme has adopted a **three-pronged approach**, firstly, a general training scheme to stimulate national awareness and develop the requisite human resources, secondly, support to individual country initiatives in institution-building and capacity enhancement for disaster preparedness, and thirdly, the provision of back-stopping support to the coordination and planning efforts of resident coordinators in times of crisis.

- ◆ The Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP), jointly developed by UNDP and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), has been in operation for seven years. It is a global facility, attempting to put into practice universal standards and methods of training. It operates on an interregional as well as on a national basis, with training activities conducted for concerned national officials, either in a home setting or through colloquia organized with participants called in from many countries.

The objective of the DMTP was to create better awareness of the potential benefits of improved disaster management. Desk officers, practitioners of development, home and field representatives of donors and implementing agencies, all needed to be party

to the learning process, so that disaster prevention possibilities, the mitigation of risk, and the assessment of vulnerabilities could be moved higher on the operational agenda of nations. Thus, training programmes not only assembled national officials, but also in-country operational personnel of the UN system agencies, staff of international and local NGOs, universities and private sector organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors, including headquarters policy makers.

In the new phase, and with UNDP taking responsibility for managing DMTP in future, the character of the programmes is set to change. Going beyond being a training activity in the art of disaster preparedness, the work will henceforth **focus on specific country situations**. A frequent criticism of the earlier programme was that there were no operational follow-up activities. Capacity-building will now be related more directly to issues of operational interest to the individual countries selected.

Box 5: Ecuador confronts the El Nino

Abnormal rains and inundations in 1997 announced the recurrence of the El Nino phenomenon. Through an emergency preparedness project UNDP provided technical assistance from TRAC 1.1.3 at a cost of \$250,000 to help the national authorities devise a plan to mitigate the effects of the ensuing climate disruptions.

The plan's four components were (i) hazard mapping of the expected effects of El Nino, based on the historical record and extrapolated to present conditions using satellite imagery; (ii) strengthening the national civil defense system; (iii) a public information and awareness campaign; and (iv) improvement of the hydro-meteorological monitoring network and early warning.

At the close of the project, the following had been accomplished:

- a hazard map of the effects of El Nino, covering the coastal provinces is available for planning emergency and mitigation measures; satellite data are readily available for specific land use studies guiding future rehabilitation and development;
- the radio communications network of the provincial civil defense offices have been greatly improved;
- radio spots and public information materials were produced and widely disseminated in high risk areas;
- the National Hydrological and Meteorological Institute has HF communication with its monitoring stations located at key points along the coast.

Inter-agency coordination was secured through the active involvement of the UN Disaster Management Team. As a result, the project could provide first-rate

technical support to visiting multilateral assessment missions and to presentations made by the Government of Ecuador to international financial institutions.

In line with this approach, DMTP staff will spend time in each country to help develop a national commitment, an institutional base and strategy for emergency management before and after engaging in the actual training of trainers. In the third stage, the mainstay of the programme, the national trainers carry out a series of local, regional and national training activities, prepare **a national disaster management plan**, and perform advocacy roles. At the end of the two-year programme, staff from the national programme units will assemble once more to exchange views on the outcomes and problems encountered.

Since the inception of the programme in early 1997, ten countries - four in Africa, three in the Arab region and three in the Caucasus - have taken part and have reached the third operational phase of the programme. Many more have declared their interest in participating.

- ◆ **Institution-building.** Prior to restructuring DMTP, allocations have been made to individual countries that wish to strengthen their institutions concerned with disaster preparedness, their planning and management capacities, either in general or in relation to specific threats.

In some situations, these objectives are met through allocations for special initiatives under Category I, sub-category (ii), inasmuch as they are a component or by-product of some other activity. This is the case in **Costa Rica**, where support was requested for the preparation of a rehabilitation and investment plan for already poor communities in the south of the country struck by Hurricane Cesar in mid-1996. The same hurricane destroyed the livelihoods of the poorest and most vulnerable populations on the Atlantic coast of **Nicaragua** (some 2,300 families), and the assistance provided is being used to set up locally based organizations able to deal more effectively with possible future events of this kind.

- ◆ **Improved food security.** Establishing better food security is a vital step in moving from humanitarian relief towards improved disaster preparedness and development. In the medium term, it is a matter of creating buffer stocks and supplying seed to farming communities; in the long term, work must be undertaken to improve agricultural productivity, food distribution and marketing systems.

A clear example of the government's determination to improve food security is the programme in the **Democratic Republic of Korea**, whose western food-producing provinces were struck by destructive hailstorms and successive flooding over two years. About 20 per cent of agricultural land lost all crops, severely affecting the lives of over 5 million people.

UNDP led the way with a TRAC 1.1.3 allocation of \$2 million for a programme of agricultural relief and rehabilitation, which was supplemented with an international appeal for immediate food and health assistance and identifying the needs for the rehabilitation and preservation of arable land. The project is concerned both with the emergency rehabilitation of devastated areas and also addresses some of the conditions necessary for establishing longer term food security.

Over 6,000 hectares have been recovered by dredging canals, reconstructing river embankments, and excavating rocks and sediments. To improve productivity, a pilot double-cropping scheme has been introduced with the supply of barley seed and fertilizer. As a result of mobilizing support for such schemes from other donors, a total additional supply of **80,000 tons of grain** could be moved to the market in the 1997 season.

◆ **Protection of the environment.** Floods, typhoons, earthquakes and other natural disasters, as well as man-made emergencies such as forest fires and oil spills, exact a heavy toll on the environment that calls for repair. The need to restore areas that have suffered environmental and economic degradation due to the presence of large numbers of refugees is another imperative that follows in the wake of an emergency.

Mongolia is prone to an array of natural calamities in the form of winter blizzards, flooding and dust storms. In 1996, due to particularly dry conditions, forest and steppe fires occurred on an unprecedented scale, destroying over 10 per cent of the forest area. A TRAC 1.1.3 allocation for community-based reforestation and disaster management at the local level was made to support the government's strategy of **reinforcing local preparedness** and prevention.

A year later, the project has made significant progress. A series of seminars and workshops for forest rangers, local government and community officials have been held throughout the country to increase public awareness and participation. And over 250 hectares have been planted with new seedlings through the effort of communities assisted by the project.

The repair of environmental degradation resulting from the **heavy influx of refugees** in their country of asylum is the focus of a regional project developed jointly with UNHCR for **Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic**

Republic of the Congo. Again, grants from many donors targeted at \$70 million will have to be pooled for this rehabilitation effort aimed at halting the adverse impact caused by the presence of some 2 million refugees on the environment and on the existing social infrastructure.

III. Signposts for Post-Crisis Action

The needs and the rationale that prompt governments to ask for support from UNDP's resource window for countries in "special development situations" are as diverse as the conditions prevailing in the countries concerned. Project implementation in turn provides a continuing programme of reality checks testing assumptions, working hypotheses and visions of the future.

The lessons learned are, at the operational and technical level, many and varied, but some **common features** stand out.

◆ Peace-building

- It is clear that humanitarian operations and development work are not effective in isolation and must be joined with political, diplomatic and economic measures in the peace-making process. It is equally evident that external development support can play a catalytic, and sometimes vital part in fostering a political dialogue across social, cultural or ethnic divisions, that is the sine qua non of any peace-building effort.
- In general, programme interventions point to the fundamental importance of good governance, functioning judicial systems and of human rights observance, and hence to providing strong support for these goals in any response strategy.

The **contribution of civil society**, in its manifold manifestations and interaction with official bodies, is as critical for the maintenance of social peace as the way government agencies perform. In some cases, joint government/civil society commissions have been created. For instance, in Guatemala, for the first time, the major universities have been brought together to lend quality and independence to information emanating from official sources, by establishing a special working relationship with the concerned government agency. In moving towards peace, political dialogue is an obvious means; at times it can also be made an end in itself. A separate project has allowed for the return of exiled Guatemalan intellectuals to set in motion a debate between segments of society which have not communicated before.

- Unresolved conflict situations highlight a common problem, which is often overlooked but which is inherent in the search for remedies intended to overcome the conditions which led to the eruption of conflict. Even where causes appear obvious, they can still be deep-seated and complex. As such, they are **difficult to target in operational terms**. Whether conflict is rooted in social and economic disparities, resource competition, ethnic or religious differences, any attempts to isolate the various factors and address them operationally can only be successful when there is a vigorous political will for peace among the former adversaries. There should also be due recognition of the fact that success in this area can often only be achieved in the long term.
- Most project documents include language showing that all concerned are aware of the risk that the **enterprise may fail**. Transitions from violent conflict to peace are fragile. The expectation of progress is often frustrated, the sought-for stable environment proves elusive, latent tensions and intermittent violence live on. Under such conditions, **delays and postponements** of key activities inevitably occur, and stand-by or contingency arrangements are brought into play. In the business of peace-building, planned project outcomes are seldom the order of the day.

◆ **Strategies for recovery**

- As with many other coordination instruments, some governments and agencies have been slow in actively supporting policy and strategy frameworks. There is however a growing appreciation of the **need for holistic approaches** that are inclusive and developed in partnership with the principal stakeholders. Such strategy frameworks need to provide a probing analysis of the root causes of the crisis as well as a road map towards recovery. This is especially true when effective government is not in place and when responsibility for harmonizing aid policies and operations is more dispersed. In disaster situations and in the absence of government leadership, aid agencies tend to look to each other for guidance and in particular to the UN resident/humanitarian coordinator.

Towards joint programming... In situations where state institutions no longer function, such as in Afghanistan, the elaboration of a system-wide **Strategic Framework** commanding the support of all donors and aid actors, accompanied by mechanisms for common programming, is likely to serve as a model for the international community. Similar progress has been made on other fronts or for specific sectors, such as in Rwanda where the critical issue of successful reintegration has led UNHCR, WFP and UNDP to set up a **joint programming** unit for all that concerns displaced returnees.

- Inevitably, because of the involvement and participation of many actors, the quest for consensus and agreement may be time-consuming, to the point of creating delays in the start-up of operations. Such delays are however a **relatively small price** to pay for better coordination and coherence.
- In some complex emergencies, experience suggests that there is a case for separating policy analysis and the assessment of needs for external assistance. Where conflict is still simmering, a searching analysis and discussion of the root causes of conflict that would normally be part of a strategic response may be counter-productive and exacerbate political sensitivities among distrustful adversaries. In such situations, it may be advisable to place emphasis on the technical aspects of the programmes being identified and stop short of addressing the origins of the dispute.

◆ Programme preparation

- Many national authorities have difficulty with the procedures of external cooperation and do not present their requirements in a manner that meets the bureaucratic needs of the donor agencies. In part, communication is difficult because **new governments often lack experience** in the procedural side of international cooperation. Local authorities - and even central governments - are often at a loss when attempting to articulate their needs or to explain how external cooperation can improve their prospects for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
- Looking at the majority of projects, it is clear that needs assessments and programme preparation are **important outcomes** of the assistance provided. In many cases, this represents the principal output of the project. Work designed to produce policy frameworks for recovery, the discussion and selection of special development initiatives in support of peace-building strategies, often forcefully bring out the need to plan for additional activities that need to be properly formulated.

◆ Resource mobilization

- Needs assessments and programme identification are essential prerequisites for mobilizing resources. This programme preparation, often carried out in the context of CAPs and Round Table documents, serves a particular donor interest: in most situations, the international community wishes to provide assistance that goes

beyond immediate humanitarian relief and looks to funding activities that can contribute to reconstruction. The record confirms that resource mobilization is an **important by-product** of the TRAC 1.1.3 allocations.

The strategy/fund-raising link... Inter-agency Consolidated Appeals, Round Table and Consultative Group documents need to devote a specific section to explaining in clear terms how the programmes for which resources are being raised relate to the origins and context of the crisis, how they support the policies advocated in the assistance framework and fit into the overall scheme of recovery.

- Thus, TRAC 1.1.3 resources act as an instrument for a **much larger international effort**, to the benefit of the country concerned. In fact, the impact of these allocations rests in large measure on their snow-balling effect in producing a critical mass of work made possible through bilateral cost-sharing contributions or through parallel funding.

◆ **Implementation procedures**

- For UNDP specifically, TRAC 1.1.3 has pointed to the necessity of amending established procedures for project implementation that have been devised for regular development projects. In particular, while preserving accountability, resident/humanitarian coordinators need to have full authority to designate qualified implementing agents, whether governmental or non-governmental. They also need access to a pool of immediately available specialist staff, and have recourse to a simplified set of procedures for the procurement of goods and services.

◆ **In-country coordination**

- Strategic approaches elaborated jointly with other interested agencies, programme preparation and resource mobilization add up to an important bonus: **improved coordination** at the local level. The process of building consensus among all parties, donors, implementing organizations and government agencies, around the principles and understandings that go into the formulation of policy frameworks, also gives quality and strength to the programme identified.
- Whether needs come to light in the course of special development initiatives, as responses recommended by the UN disaster management teams to sudden crisis, or during disaster preparedness workshops, assistance is more likely to be successful when there is full consultation and when known policies and strategies guide the

programme. Donors will then be more confident in providing the full range of resources needed to move towards orderly development, when called upon to help achieve more durable solutions to nations debilitated by crisis.