

**OPERATIONALISING
RECOVERY FROM CRISIS**

**A Review of the Work of the Transition Recovery Unit
of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP**

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¹⁾ The designation Transition Recovery Unit (TRU) or BCPR/TRU is used throughout this presentation, in line with the terms of reference. Several other designations appear to be current, such as The Recovery Cluster, the Recovery Unit and the Transition Recovery Team. The Recovery Team now appears to be the official designation, used in the most recent pamphlet on the activities of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

I. INTRODUCTION

1. **Basing policy on practice.** The creation of the Transitional Recovery Unit (TRU) within the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is an institutional device designed to engage UNDP more effectively in the process of post-humanitarian rehabilitation and development in countries affected by crisis. A key component of improving UNDP's response in such situations is the provision of timely technical and programming support to Country Offices, and through the Resident Coordinator to the UN Country Teams.
2. The existence of a valid operational method, tested and retested in practice, to strengthen the capacity of the CO's is critical. All other goals set by the Unit are contingent on the pragmatics that such an operational programme generates.
3. Thus, TRU objectives such as the
 - systemization of transition recovery programmes
 - mainstreaming of transition recovery policies
 - establishing partnerships with other agencies
 - developing resource mobilization strategies

can only be attained if firmly based on the identification of needs and on the programming experience of governments and Country Offices at the country level.

4. The technical and programming support services provided by TRU to CO's meet this requirement. Grounded as they are on experience accumulated in other countries, they help achieve a better understanding of the issues confronting governments and UN Country Teams in crisis and post-conflict situations.
5. In the wider context, TRU's services can therefore also serve as an effective instrument of UNDP policy and materially assist the CO's to promote standards in the following areas, by
 - identifying needs and programmes relevant to the country's situation
 - focusing on local and national capacities
 - helping to ensure that recovery is more than a return to status quo
 - incorporating conflict prevention in UN assistance frameworks
 - integrating peace-building and reconciliation in community programmes
 - narrowing the funding gap between relief and development work
6. Succinctly expressed in this way, timely programme advice to CO's in crisis countries offers a viable and rational approach for external support to the national process of recovery.

7. **Methodology.** The review encompasses the period since November 2001 to the present, during which more systemic transition recovery services have been provided. For TRU, this has been a build-up phase which hardly offers the basis for an evaluation of results. Clearly the objectives set for TRU are complex in nature and the Unit will need time to demonstrate its potential impact in terms of external support for recovery in CPC countries.
8. In line with the TORs, the assessment will accordingly not attempt to assess outcomes, which cannot be measured at this point. The report will instead focus on the manner in which TRU is conducting its business, on its influence if any on policy formation, and on the progress made in moving to deliver the various services associated with the transition recovery in the countries selected by BCPR for special attention.
9. As TRU's principal clients, the views of the Resident Coordinators and staff in the COs inevitably had to be canvassed. This has been done, firstly, through extensive telephone conversations with staff of the COs involved, prepared in advance with a series of pertinent questions, and secondly, for a more in depth understanding, through visits to three countries, Bosnia, Eritrea and Nepal, that have benefited from TRU services during the past year.
10. A matter of particular interest is how TRU has organized itself in pursuit of its various goals. A critical objective is the ambition to narrow the resource gap that affects rehabilitation and recovery activities in the post-conflict period. It is of interest to assess the steps taken by TRU to contribute to the fund-raising process, within the strategies adopted by BCPR in this regard.
11. **The wider framework.** An institutional initiative such as TRU tends to be conditioned by the way it is perceived by the other interested parties, external and internal. At the country level, much will depend on the views and attitudes of resident coordinators, UN country teams and NGOs; at headquarters level, the regional bureaus within UNDP, IFIs and relief agencies (OCHA, WFP, UNHCR) and the specialized agencies. Their perceptions affect TRU's work to establish viable working partnerships. Without presuming to give a complete picture, the assessment therefore highlights this factor and its possible impact on field level coordination.
12. Much of the support provided by TRU to COs has been initiated by the BCPR directorate and in conjunction with other units of BCPR. For this reason TRU's interaction with resident coordinators and staff at the country offices is not necessarily seen as distinct from that with BCRP, or for that matter with UNDP as a whole. This applies even more to government agencies, NGOs and other outside organizations that have little knowledge of the way UNDP is set up internally. Thus some of the observations made may not apply to TRU exclusively.

II. OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

i) General

1. **A phase of expansion.** Resources and technical advice relating to rehabilitation and recovery in CPC countries have been provided to country offices over many years. They were stepped up in the mid-1990s, with the institution of a separate funding window (TRAC 113) for allocation in “countries in special development circumstances”. Resources were allocated to conduct needs assessments and prepare national strategic assistance frameworks, to formulate sectoral programmes and initiate their implementation, *inter alia* in the field of disaster reduction and mitigation, as well as to strengthen the capacity of COs in times of crisis.
2. With financial and institutional support from interested donor countries, and with the elevation of the former Emergency Response Division (ERD) to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). UNDP has conspicuously raised its capacity to engage in recovery programmes in crisis and post-conflict (CPC) countries. The present review of the functioning of TRU deals with one of the several technical and programme support units instituted within BCPR and is therefore only one segment of this increased engagement.
3. There is no single document issued by BCPR that qualifies as the terms of reference for TRU. Rather, the principles and guidelines for its work are contained in several documents, the principal being a) DP/2001/4 submitted to the Executive Board on the Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations, b) the Transitional Recovery Concept Note dated May 2001, c) the Thematic Trust Fund for CPR (Service Line 2: Transition Recovery), and lastly d) the Work Plan submitted to DfID as part of the request for institutional support for TRU and other units of BCPR.
4. **On a learning curve.** Even with two retreats and a few workshops, it remains that that the terms of reference of the Unit are for the most part subsumed in documents dealing with the overall mission of BCPR. Read together with the Work Plan, a recent 4-page pamphlet on TRU, which follows closely the Thematic Trust Fund description of its Transition Recovery service line, may in fact be the most comprehensive, albeit brief, statement of TRU’s mission and operations during the year under review.
5. Like BCPR as a whole, TRU has gone through a phase of rapid expansion during the past year. Beginning from almost scratch, TRU now has 12 professional staff and 2 support staff members. In a sense, as a new organizational entity, TRU has embarked on a learning curve which is not yet at an end. In addition, through its Operations Support Group, BCPR is establishing an in-house programme implementation capacity both for headquarters and field operations, never an easy or smooth proposition. With the experience gathered over the past year, a fresh look is

appropriate in terms of how TRU fits into the overall organizational scheme of things in BCPR.

6. For TRU, the various changes in designation of the constituent units of BCPR have made it difficult to build up name recognition as a provider of specific services or products. Known consecutively as the “Recovery Cluster”, the “Recovery Unit”, the “Transition Recovery Unit” and now the “Recovery Team”, some of its identity is lost with every name change. In describing the functions of the Unit, the UNDP/BCPR web-page even uses the designation “Transitional Recovery Unit”.
7. **Logical framework analysis.** As part of the reporting to DfID, a logframe analysis is presented accounting for the activities carried out by the Unit in 2002, showing the results obtained and matching these against the objectives of the Work Plan. Its overarching goal is to facilitate the transition to social and economic recovery in CPC countries.

Subsidiary objectives

- To strengthen UNDP’s institutional capacity to plan and implement transitional recovery strategies;
- To strengthen global partnerships for transitional recovery activities;
- To develop and advocate policies in the area of transitional recovery;
- To develop resource mobilization strategies for transitional recovery activities;
- Enhanced knowledge networking on transitional recovery strategies and approaches;
- To capacitate and empower the Transition Recovery Unit.

8. In the 2002 Work Plan, supporting each objective, individual missions by TRU staff to the BCPR focus countries are grouped under Activity headings and sub-headings, with little to distinguish between some of the headings. For instance, Activity 1.1: The development of in-house strategies to support COs in transition recovery activities, and Activity 1.3: The strengthening of UNDP CO capacity for social and economic recovery, in reality amount to the same thing and indeed the same country missions figure under both headings.
9. Similar overlaps occur in the description of other objectives and activities. Not surprisingly, the presentation of activities has been consolidated in the Work Plan for 2003, and the number of objectives has been reduced from six to four.
10. The objectives stated in TRU’s Work Plan are furthermore also those of BCPR’s other units and those of BCPR itself, with the result that TRU’s specific contribution is in many cases, if not difficult to identify, at least seen as part of a larger effort. This overlap in attributions is probably unavoidable as the TRU recovery agenda spans a wider range than other technical units in BCPR.

11. There is one fairly obvious omission in the general presentation of objectives, activities and results, viz. a reference to government ownership and role in the CPC countries concerned. While no doubt unintended, the work plan strikes the reader as UNDP-centric, concerned only with the capacities, ambitions and resources of UNDP, and tending to play down the role of other UN agencies in the field and the UNCT.

ii) A Menu of Services

12. **More emphasis on service lines.** While useful for monitoring purposes in the build-up phase of TRU, logframe analysis may not now be the best management tool for moving forward as far as TRU is concerned. Too often, it leads to repetitiveness and claims that are ambiguous and in the end difficult to substantiate. While aiming at the overarching goal of facilitating social and economic recovery in CPC situations, TRU is not a project in the ordinary sense of the word. Rather, it is an organizational entity of a larger body providing a service product. In other words, in conducting its business, TRU has every interest in placing more emphasis on its products than on activities involving the delivery of a product that is in most cases not very well defined.
13. In canvassing the views of the COs regarding the service products, it was clear that they did not always have a full picture of what services might be available from TRU. In the questionnaire sent to COs in advance of the interviews, they were asked to rank a shortlist of possible service products in terms of their perceived needs.

Defining the product

- Assessment of needs, national or regional
- Multi-sector recovery framework, nation-wide or regional in scope
- Crisis prevention and conflict impact assessment
- Support for coordination
- Provision of guidelines and best practices
- Formulation of sector programmes/projects
- Support for resource mobilisation
- Backstopping project implementation (CO/DEX)
- Training of UNCT members/government officials
- Creating extra capacity within CO to perform any or some of the above

14. As expected, the rankings were different in each CO and furthermore varied with time. Thus, while priority might have been given a year ago to the assessment of needs, present requirements focused on follow-up and mid-term reviews of ongoing programmes. By and large however COs reacted positively to an identification of services of this kind.

15. Again, many of the service products cannot be provided by TRU alone and other units of BCPR, and/or outside consultants, will have to be associated with the process. TRU will however have special responsibilities in its areas of specialization, Area-based Development, DDR and support of the IDPs, and because of the all-round expertise of its field advisers, TRU should be able to contribute in other areas as well.
16. Here also, there is overlap between the various categories, but they are sufficiently marked to allow delineation. A practical way of making the switch to a more product-oriented approach would be to prepare one-two page product descriptions, succinctly presenting their purpose, relevance to specific situations and expected results. As a matter of course, when a mission is undertaken, two or three products can be rolled into one, as appropriate.
17. A more consistent emphasis on the service product would also allow for establishing which service products are in greatest demand by the COs so that supply of services and professional profiles can over time be better tailored to needs and match demand.

iii) Transition Recovery Teams

18. **Taking over from UNDAC.** The fielding of Transitional Recovery Teams (TRT) was an important element of the original concept behind the expansion of BCPR and its predecessor ERD. It was seen as the recovery and development counterpoint to the UNDAC teams fielded by OCHA in humanitarian emergencies. Typically, TRTs would be multi-disciplinary and deployed following major natural disasters or violent events in an ongoing complex emergency. They would operate for more extended periods than UNDACs and assist the Resident Coordinator in planning and organizing recovery and reconstruction. Implicitly, an important output of a TRT would be an integrated framework for recovery and reconstruction.
19. To date, early versions of the TRT concept has been tried out in Gujarat, India, following the earthquake there in 2001, as well as in Mozambique after the serious flooding in 2000, mainly as tools enabling UNDP to engage more rapidly in the recovery process.
20. In particular, the TRT concept has been strongly supported as an important operational approach by DfID, a major contributor to BCPR. In a study carried out by a DfID consultant in mid-2002, TRTs are seen as a useful device to assemble the organizational resources and capacities of BCPR when dealing with specific CPC situations on an urgent basis.
21. **A fading concept.** With time the TRT concept appears to be fading. It was conceived in a situation when ERD was short-staffed and unable to support COs effectively in times of need. In a sense, the TRT concept has fallen victim to the staff expansion of BCPR and the ability of BCPR/TRU to service COs on a routine basis, by responding quickly to calls for missions to help carry out specific tasks.

22. At another level, the question may be asked, what constitutes a team? At a minimum, two specialists qualify as a team, but three or four would be better. In theory, all but individual missions could therefore qualify as TRTs; if used frequently such a designation could have had the advantage of gaining better product or process recognition. This option seems however to have been put aside and would now be difficult to apply, as the BCPR units have been re-designated as Teams, rather than clusters or units: thus, a “Recovery Team” already operates from BCPR Geneva.
23. As a potential service product, the TRT concept is still evolving. The present position appears to favour its application only in major transition recovery settings (Afghanistan would be an example) where UNDP anticipates playing a substantial role. This would also be in conformity with the inter-agency and multi-sector missions assembled by TRU for Sudan, Sri Lanka and Angola, which produced reports akin to cross-sectoral recovery frameworks.
24. TRT interventions would entail a multi-disciplinary team providing sustained support to the UNDP/CO for periods up to three months helping it to take on major work functions that address rehabilitation and development needs. Because of their multi-sector character, TRTs need to relate strongly to the UNCT as a whole, and any tendency to look at TRTs as an opportunity to bolster UNDP fund-raising for its own account would soon contradict their purpose. If a TRT is to produce an integrated recovery framework crossing sector lines, it clearly has to be working on behalf of the UNCT and the UN system. This would not in any way diminish the potential role that UNDP can play.

iv) Management Issues

37. **Allocation of staff time.** With the broad agenda outlined in the TRU Work Plan, and disposing of a limited number of staff grouped in two general categories as Senior Field Advisers and Recovery Programme Specialists, plus an Economist, as well as three Programme Assistants, setting priorities for their deployment is no easy matter.
38. In the first place, all senior staff are given responsibility for certain countries and regions, so that the knowledge and experience they acquire over repeated missions are cumulative and put to good use for the next mission; COs know that they deal with somebody who is familiar with their problems. Management-wise, this is feasible due to the limited number of focus countries in the BCPR/TRU programme.
39. Senior staff members are also assigned responsibility for contacts with specific outside institutions, as well thematic responsibilities, such as DDR, Area-based development, micro-credit, etc. In some of these areas, the Work Plan foresees the development of guidelines and best practices. The Interim Report to DfID for 2002 reveals that in almost all cases the normative part and systematization of the UNDP experience in CPCs is falling behind planned output targets.

40. It is hardly surprising that this happens. In the start-up period, the need has been felt to accumulate the necessary operational experience in the field. Providing urgent support to COs also often takes precedence over the more long term consideration of guidelines and best practice. At any given time, on the average, about half of office strength is on a field mission and away from headquarters. Over say a two-month period, some senior staff only spend a quarter of the time in Geneva.
41. **Systematising the UNDP experience.** Any programme of mainstreaming transition recovery policies will entail the preparation and dissemination of short descriptions of existing service products, checklists, technical presentations and advisory notes as well as guidelines and institutional positions on best practices, along the lines suggested in Section IV.
42. A programme of this order does not always come easy, and will require sustained management attention over an extended period, so that senior staff who have been assigned responsibility for specific themes or technical areas also produce the paperwork that in the end can make mainstreaming a reality.
43. A series of papers spanning the entire range, from product descriptions, through technical briefs to finalized best practice documentation fits neatly into the CPR Knowledge Networking that was launched in September 2002, the youngest of the six UNDP Practice Networks. Already, the Network counts 440 members, 70 percent of them working in COs in all four regions, and is bound to become the primary instrument for mainstreaming the UNDP experience in national recovery and associated policies.
44. **Use of consultants.** The job descriptions for Senior Field Advisers indicate that they are expected to spend half of their time on field missions, and up to 70 per cent to backstop the COs. To redress the balance between providing surge capacity to COs and engaging in normative duties at headquarters, it would be necessary to increase the use of consultants.
45. Already work is under way to establish, for each substantive unit in BCPR, a consultant roster with a limited number of core, quality-checked specialists to act as consultants of preference and making repeated assignments in the principal service areas. In this way the use of senior headquarters staff for field missions can be reduced, providing more space for the normative part of BCPR/TRU's work.
46. Such a roster is designed to obtain the best competencies available. In this regard, it may be appropriate in some cases to outsource missions to sister agencies, such as UNCDF, UNOPS, ILO, FAO and WHO, especially in situations where they can be associated with DEX arrangements for programme implementation by the CO. Similarly, it will be advantageous to have on the roster specialists who are known to donor agencies and have carried out field assignments for them.

III. SUPPORT TO THE COUNTRY OFFICES

1. **Fulsome appreciation.** The stock-in-trade of BCPR/TRU is support to the COs, attempting to satisfy their diverse requirements. In the course of 2002, TRU alone was able to field some 30 individual missions to 15 countries. In many cases the TRU field advisers and recovery specialists carried out joint missions with members of other BCPR units, or were supported by outside consultants. In five cases, other UN agencies took part; in one instance, in Eritrea in January 2003, donors also participated in a mission organized jointly with UNHCR, UNV and the World Bank. .
2. It is not easy to categorize these missions (see Section II, ii), paras 12 – 17 above), except to say that they provided material assistance for varying periods to COs in the different recovery service lines identified in the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. The effectiveness and timeliness of this assistance, overall, is acknowledged by every CO consulted in the course of the present study.
3. In general, Regional Bureaus echo this appreciation, while making the point that Bureaus and COs have been downsized in recent years as a result of staff reductions and re-profiling: BCPR in contrast has undergone a major expansion.
4. The almost unanimous verdict of COs is that BCPR/TRU support has made a significant difference, technically and financially, to their programmes. This is not to say that every support mission has met its objectives in every way. As one interlocutor put it: “TRU missions may not all have been successful (in raising funds, for instance), but they have always been productive.”
5. In some cases, comments border on the euphoric; epithets like “outstanding”, “remarkable” were heard, coming from old UNDP hands. One Resident Coordinator conceded: “If BCPR had not been there, I wouldn’t have been here now”. Praise cannot be stated more fulsomely.
6. **Canvassing the CO views.** To ascertain the views of the COs, a list of questions, which are reproduced in annex, was sent in advance to the COs of 10 focus countries, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, DRC, Eritrea, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Tajikistan. Interaction between BCPR/TRU and COs was looked at in more depth in three countries and their specifics are accounted for separately.
7. If anything, they demonstrate the extent to which each situation is one of a kind. Some of the answers to questions that the three selected countries have in common with the other COs interviewed are summarized in this Section. Interview findings are also accounted for in Section II, in relation to service lines and TRTs; in Sections IV, dealing with guidelines and the systemization of the UNDP experience; and in Section V in reference to partnerships and resource mobilization.

i) Selected Focus Countries

Eritrea

4. **Background.** In terms of joint and purposeful action, the UN system in Eritrea has the benefit of a well-functioning UN Country Team and a Government that increasingly takes its coordinating role seriously, using every opportunity to demonstrate national ownership. It is necessary to factor this in when judging the role of BCPR/TRU as it is an important backdrop to any assessment of present-day international relief and recovery activities in the country.
5. In a manner of speaking, Eritrea is presently in a halfway house between emergency and normalcy. On the one hand, the peace agreement with Ethiopia in December 2000 has set the stage for the return of refugees and IDPs to their areas of origin; on the other, a severe drought threatens to undo once more all progress made hitherto. A new possible disaster looms; if the rains fail again in 2003, a total of 2.4 million people, or two thirds of the population of Eritrea, would be at risk.
6. The following programmes of a transition/recovery nature are currently in various stages of the project cycle. Total contributions raised so far in each case are indicated in brackets:
 - Provision of Shelter and Household Items (\$2,327,000)
 - Capacity-Building for Mine Action (\$354,000)
 - Operational Support to the Eritrean Demining Agency (\$500,000)
 - Post-War Eritrean Recovery Programme, PoWER (\$2,177,000)
 - Land Mine Impact Survey and Capacity-Building (\$3,143,000)
 - Demobilization and Reintegration, Technical Support (\$580,000)
 - Integrated Recovery Programme (In the process of formulation)
7. The donors involved are Italy, Netherlands, EU, Canada, Norway, US and UK, having contributed a total of \$9,080,000. This represents about 54 per cent of the funds requested. The first three programmes were submitted in the CAP, whilst the other projects have been developed outside the CAP process.
8. It should be noted that the contribution to the fourth project listed, the Post-War Eritrean Recovery programme (PoWER), is a supplementary grant made by Italy from an emergency budget line, adding to the initial 1999 contribution of \$16.19 million for this effort; this successful resource acquisition was a joint and converging effort of the then ERD and the Eritrean CO.
9. **Services provided by BCPR/TRU.** The earlier involvement of ERD in securing financing for the PoWER programme, which has been implemented by the CO through a Programme Management Unit (PMU), made natural TRU lead participation

in the mid-term evaluation of the programme in July 2002, providing financing for the mission leader and two participants. The Government and the donor fielded the other two members of the evaluation mission. The evaluation was conducted to the satisfaction of all stakeholders involved. The conclusions and lessons learnt are to the point and carry weight.

10. With Eritrea emerging from crisis and post-conflict, the UNCT and the Government produced its first UNDAF in May 2002, building on a CCA prepared one year earlier, in the midst of crisis. One of the four thematic groups established under the UNDAF is dedicated to Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and is chaired jointly by the Government and UNDP/UNHCR.
11. An important item of business for this thematic group has been the preparatory work carried out by UNHCR for a major effort called the “Integrated Recovery Programme”, a test case of the 4”R” approach, which would tackle comprehensively the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure, the needs arising from the return and reintegration of refugees, expellees, IDPs and demobilized soldiers, as well as those of their host communities.
12. The UNCT asked UNDP to co-lead with the Government a programme formulation exercise, in which not only the concerned UN agencies took part, but also representatives of several donors. The mission was led by a TRU Recovery Programme Specialist. It took place 13-21 January 2003 and is part of a practical demonstration in four different countries of what can be achieved to fill the “gap” between relief and development, in line with the prescriptions of the 4 “R” or Brookings process.
13. **Assessment – the CO view.** In assessing the role of TRU in providing additional capacity to the CO and the UNCT in Eritrea, it should be borne in mind that there is already good local capacity. Within the CO, the programme management unit (PMU) for the PoWER programme has been the focal point for all recovery matters. Within the UNCT, the thematic group established under the UNDAF exercise acts as the corresponding focal group; it reviewed the terms of reference for the Integrated Recovery Programme elaborated by UNHCR following extensive studies by outside consultants.
14. Building on its association with ERD, the CO has from the outset sought to interact with BCPR/TRU. In all cases the Government was consulted and kept abreast of any developments relating to services provided by TRU. On the whole, the CO was satisfied with the substantive and operational support received and finds it to be a significant improvement on that provided earlier. It would nevertheless wish to make qualifications on a couple of points.
 - Constraints have been experienced as a result of protracted delays in the administrative area. This has in particular affected the handling of contracts for the international posts in the PMU of the PoWER programme.

- There is a need for greater transparency in the use of overheads deducted from donor contributions. The CO finds it difficult to justify to the Government and to donors the 8 percent overhead charged on contributions to the predecessor of the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, as distinct from the 5 percent stipulated in the Trust Fund pamphlet. The Government and donors repeatedly raise questions on this score and in particular whether the international posts in the PMU are defrayed from this source or from programme funds. Combined with the overheads charged by implementing partners and NGOs, which are typically in the 15-20 per cent bracket, donors remain concerned by the consequent reduction in programmable resources.
 - There was some consternation at the last-minute replacement of the mission leader for the Integrated Recovery Programme needs assessment and formulation. Considerable ground-work over several months had gone into securing a senior staff member as team leader to provide credible UNDP leadership to this Brookings or “4R” exercise. Substituting a new-comer to UNDP as mission leader was seen to undo this effort and provide grist to the mill of those who contend that UNDP is not up to coordinating large programming missions of this kind. In the event, the UNCT was impressed with the abilities and performance of the substitute mission leader. The Resident Coordinator qualified the matter as an “accident” in an otherwise productive BCPR-CO relationship.
15. With respect to the services that TRU could provide, the CO believes there is a need for more structured documentation as to what is on offer. In ranking the needs of the CO/UNCT in terms of the different types of services TRU could deliver, the CO/UNCT would give first priority to support for resource mobilization, and second, to the temporary strengthening of the CO. Currently, support for the assessment of needs would be given low priority.
16. In terms of training requirements, the RC could not speak for the other members of the UNCT, but believed training ranked high on their wish-list, targeting in particular government officials and UN staff active in the UNDAF Thematic Group on Recovery.
17. A clear case for follow-up support on the part of BCPR/TRU exists with respect to resource mobilization for the Integrated Recovery Programme, as a pilot 4 “R” exercise. Eritrea is neither a CG nor a RT country, having elected to convene its own “Development Partners Conference” when soliciting external support for its development. It is generally agreed that a recovery effort of this magnitude should not be taken up in the framework of a CAP; rather, the Resident Coordinator foresees a pledging conference, under Government chairmanship, co-sponsored by the WB, UNHCR and UNDP. To secure high-level participation, the venue should be outside Eritrea, in a neutral location away from the headquarters of any of the agencies concerned. If any such arrangement becomes a real prospect, BCPR/TRU is likely to be tasked with its organization.

18. The CO deemed the successive CAPs for Eritrea to have been very useful fund-raising instruments. A success rate of 67 percent had been achieved through the 2001 CAP; this had fallen back to 37 percent in 2002. As a consequence of the current drought better returns are expected through the 2003 CAP which was launched by the President of Eritrea in November 2002.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H)

19. **Background.** Despite a post-conflict period marked by slow progress on the social and economic front, and towards reconciliation across the ethnic and religious divide, a fragile peace continues to prevail. In terms of the main indicator of recovery – the return of people displaced by the war – a total of about 1 million refugees and displaced persons have now returned to their former homes. Notably, a significant increase in the rate of returns has been registered in the last two years.

20. There remain some 560,000 refugees and displaced persons who still need support to return and reintegrate in their communities of origin. Donors have provided considerable resources for the reconstruction of physical infrastructure and housing; far less has been invested in the “software” of recovery and reconciliation. Yet, greater rates of return, including two-way and chain returns, will not be achieved unless local governance is reformed and social services restored, at least partially; civil society organizations must be strengthened to break down any residual trends cementing ethnic separation and to reduce corruption; and employment and income generation are indispensable to stimulating the economy in rural and urban areas.

21. A large part of UNDP support over the years has heeded this logic by focusing on area-based rehabilitation and development interventions. Since 1996 over USD 57 million have been dedicated, through UNDP and UNOPS, to integrated area-based efforts in four separate regions, designed to facilitate the return of minority groups by revitalizing host communities and municipalities in a manner that stands a chance of being sustainable over time. The latest such UNDP effort, which is still under development, concerns three municipalities in the area Srebrenica, a joint initiative with the UN Mission in B&H.

22. Donor support to communities hosting returning refugees and DPs has been limited by the special conditionality applied, namely that host communities must facilitate such returns, seen as a positive inducement for their cooperation. For many years, this funding embargo has prevented assistance from reaching areas such as Srebrenica.

23. Ironically, now that returns are taking place and support becomes possible, there is evidence of donor fatigue and waning interest in the predicament of B&H and its continuing problems. External support to B&H has been declining at the approximate rate of 25 percent per year. Pledging so far for the Srebrenica area-based effort only covers some 40 percent of the resources requested.

24. In this donor climate, the RC believes there is a real risk that declining support could lead to a reversal of the return migration unless more resources are provided.
25. Other programmes in B&H within the ambit of crisis prevention and post-conflict recovery include support to the national mine action programme and the establishment of an Early Warning System providing for the systematic monitoring of selected indicators in the political, social and economic areas. There is further a confidence-building project run by UNVs which has so far held 33 workshops in 11 municipalities, attempting to overcome ethnic prejudice among youth.
26. The UNDP programme in B&H is gradually shifting from recovery-oriented action to interventions of a more pronounced development nature. Transition recovery projects however still represent some 50 percent of the total programme. A first CCA has been completed, and an UNDAF is slated for preparation during the coming year.
27. **Services provided by BCPR/TRU.** Services provided to the CO are limited to fielding a mission to design and formulate an area-based programme comprising three municipalities, including Srebrenica, called the Srebrenica Regional Recovery Programme (SRRP). The mission was divided in two parts, an initial preparatory visit by a Senior Field Adviser, backed up as team leader by four consultants in the second leg of the exercise. The missions were financed from a TRAC 113 allocation.
28. Further support was provided by UNDP/BCPR in organizing a donor conference in New York in May 2002. Costed at USD 12.5 million, the SRRP represents a classical area-based rehabilitation and development programme, providing an integrated framework for action in four interrelated fields, economic development, municipal governance, civil society and social welfare, and infrastructure and housing reconstruction.
29. **Assessment – the CO view.** Bosnia/Herzegovina figures on the various lists of priority countries to which TRU gives special attention. Yet, the distinct impression of the CO is that B&H is not a BCPR focus country. The Resident Coordinator stated that it was only after much discussion, involving the RBEC and stressing the high profile character of the project, sponsored also by UNMIBH, that BCPR/TRU services were finally provided. In addition, the following observations were made:
- Once TRU was on board, the process went very well. Three of the four external consultants had however been identified by the CO on its own, apparently for lack of a TRU roster of specialists in the disciplines needed. The Resident Coordinator stressed that it was important that the CO was comfortable with the team leader and vice versa, for the mission to be successful.
 - Although the various government entities concerned had been kept abreast of the Srebrenica initiative, full consultation and national ownership had not been sought as it was feared this might derail the enterprise. At the time, the intervention was viewed by the State Presidency and the Republika Srpska (RS) as sensitive and a

UN affair; discussions with the Government were accordingly at “arms length”. Some of the political sensitivities had since subsided, and the authorities of the RS had now made a significant monetary contribution to the project.

- Project operations had begun, although donor earmarking of their contributions to specific budget lines presented problems. There was a need to follow up TRU’s successful programme formulation by demonstrating to donors results and outcomes that justified more aggressive fund raising on the part of the CO. In this connection, it was unclear under what conditions COs could call on the BCPR Directorate for fund-raising support.

30. Normally, the CO does its own resource mobilization and 95 percent of programme funds have been raised directly by the CO in bilateral negotiations with donors. The SRRP had been included in the most recent CAP but this had not yielded results, confirming the generally poor response in the funding of recovery programmes through the CAP channel. A negative response had also been received from the World Bank Post-conflict Fund.

31. In terms of the “4R” or Brookings process, the significant resources acquired and expended since 1996 for area-based reintegration and recovery, reported to amount to some USD 57 million, should provide clues as to the efficacy of such programmes in narrowing the funding gap for recovery activities. While not a test case in this context, the experience of B&H is very relevant to the process and deserves to be investigated.

32. As regards information on the services that TRU can offer, the CO did not have a full or clear picture of the Unit’s capacities or how they could complement the capacities it had built up as a result of its DEX operations which were already significant. The CO therefore already had some surge capacity.

Nepal

33. **Background.** Collaboration between BCPR and the Nepal CO began in early 2002 following recognition by the CO that UNDP programmes needed to be re-examined in depth with a view to establishing if and in what way they impacted on the violent conflict that began in 1996 with the Maoist insurrection.

34. It was a recognition reached only after protracted soul-searching. Despite five years of state-of-the-art decentralized governance, participatory planning and capacity-building at local levels, carried out under UNDP’s flagship project Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP), districts in which the programme was operating remained hotbeds of rebellion. By the end of 2002 Maoists were reported to control about one third of the rural areas of the country.

35. As many as 2000 village development council offices country-wide – as symbols of established authority – have been gutted with the loss of all records and documentation, Community assets, such as schools, health posts, micro-hydro stations and suspension bridges have been destroyed in large numbers.
36. Yet the notion that there could be any linkage with government policy of devolution of authority – and UNDP’s support for it – was initially met with denial, in particular on the part of the Government. The project’s banner motto was “Putting People First”; even the PDDP annual report for 2001 makes no reference to the insurgency, only to the “not so easy working environment”.
37. Unexpectedly, a cease-fire between government forces and the Maoist insurgents was agreed at the end of January 2003. A month later the peace is holding; there have been no major breaches of the cease-fire, channels of communication are opening up and there is greater freedom of movement in rural areas.
38. **Services provided by BCPR/TRU.** In response to a request by the CO, BCPR sent a multi-disciplinary team to Nepal in May 2002 to carry out a diagnostic exercise and help UNDP realign its programme portfolio in the light of the growing conflict. Three members of the mission were from TRU, who used GIS to make an analysis of the districts targeted in the UNDP programme and assisted in preparing a bridging phase from PDDP to a new prospective project supporting local governance. The Mission included other members of BCPR, a specialist from the Disaster Reduction and Recovery Unit, a representative of OCHA and a conflict analysis consultant.
39. Mission findings are accounted for in a comprehensive document entitled Crisis in Nepal: A Development Response, which identifies conflict-sensitive factors within programmes, their objectives and activities, and recommends that these should be subjected to an ongoing review in terms of their conflict impact. Two one-day conflict assessment workshops were held, bringing together 60 participants from UN agencies and other organizations, as well as government officials, and applying conflict analysis methodologies to projects in Nepal.
40. Follow-up missions have subsequently been carried out by TRU to assist with the transition aspects of the programme, and the reinvigoration of local governance. With the announcement of the cease-fire, further assistance has been provided to the CO by TRU in preparing the outline and plan of action for a UN system/donor intervention in the most affected areas, in support of the peace process.
41. As a result of the May 2002 Mission, BCPR and the CO drew up a cooperation framework, a loose agreement detailing the follow-up support, through staff assignment and funding, that BCPR is prepared to provide over the coming 12 months in different areas, *inter alia* by funding a senior policy adviser on peace and development to focus on the various aspects of crisis prevention and peace-building.

42. **Assessment – the CO view.** There can be little doubt that BCPR and TRU support to the CO has greatly contributed to the re-evaluation of the Nepali programme and to its future design. There is greater awareness of possible unintended results, of the need to “do no harm”, causing the various stakeholders, and UNDP in particular, to look at social factors more consistently through the conflict prevention lens.

- Throughout, the CO has involved the concerned government ministries and the UNCT, and kept them abreast of the findings of the various missions. Their impact thus goes well beyond the UNDP/CO itself, in terms of stronger development partnerships and in the area of resource realized. With the new focus on conflict factors, the UK and Norway have subscribed fresh funds for a bridging phase for the LGSP (Local government support programme) in the total amount of USD 2.5 million.
- The posting of a UNDP Conflict Analyst and Adviser will provide a strong focal point for transition and recovery issues within the CO, which in turn will strengthen the corresponding focal group of the UNCT. BCPR’s selection of Nepal as a focus country, and the framework agreement with the CO, are thus likely to be productive, with their impact will extending well beyond UNDP.
- BCPR and TRU get high marks from the CO and are seen as a professional and dynamic group. Within UNDP, they are singled out for their quick response and for being service-minded. In the area of resource mobilization, BCPR has proved very helpful. With the one exception of the recruitment of the policy adviser on conflict, the recruitment of outside consultants had been rapid and timely.

43. In consideration of the different service products TRU would be able to provide, the CO puts first the temporary strengthening of its own capacity, in the case of Nepal to carry out a review of the conflict-related aspects of the UNDP programme. In the eyes of the CO, the listed products all appear to be appropriate and in demand; it was opined however that any help with the elaboration of recovery and development frameworks should in future focus as much as possible on national progress towards the achievement of the MDGs.

ii) Other Focus Countries

44. **Planned support.** In three cases, Indonesia, Nepal and the Sudan, BCPR and the COs have drawn up cooperation agreements outlining the support, technical and financial, that the respective COs require and indicating what the various units of BCPR, including TRU, can provide. In Nepal and Sudan, this collaboration has provided for the posting of a senior conflict analyst and adviser for a period of 12 months.

45. In the case of Indonesia, the agreement provides for the assignment of a senior field adviser from TRU for a total of two months. Such agreements or MOUs have the

advantage of allowing the CO to draw on BCPR/TRU support in a planned fashion. Indonesia is of particular interest as it has built up considerable local capacity for programming and implementation, creating within the CO a crisis prevention and recovery unit (CPRU), with substantial institutional and programme support from DfID (USD 6.5 mn over a 3-year period), as well as from other donors.

46. CPRU Indonesia has 14 professional staff, about half of them out-posted. It is operationally oriented and seeks to establish an early presence on the ground as soon as needs have been assessed. The magnitude of this CO effort can be gauged by the resources so far mobilized for crisis prevention and recovery, which amount to USD 21 mn, with an equivalent amount under discussion.
47. The Indonesian experience is somewhat unique but will no doubt prove to be important in generating material and new ideas. Eventually, it should be possible for CPRU to prepare a best practice paper on decentralized and fast-track recovery interventions for the guidance of other COs.
48. **Interaction with national authorities.** Countries in CPC situations often present challenges in the way COs interact with them. Strong central authority is an exception, and there is frequently no single counterpart interlocutor. In some cases, governments pursue policies of decentralization (Indonesia, Bosnia, Nepal); this means that regional, district and village authorities and/or elected councils need to be consulted and brought on board. In other cases, central power is factionalized and does not hold sway in all parts of the country (Bosnia, DRC, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan).
49. In such situations, COs have to exercise ingenuity in devising practical arrangements for counterpart consultation. Judging by their responses, COs generally manage to navigate successfully between diverse and opposing political interests. In-country coordination however requires good local knowledge, and specific TRU support for coordination in respect of government authorities ranks low on the CO wish-list.
50. Again, there were exceptions, as for instance in Sri Lanka, where technical assistance was provided to the national coordinating body, probably the one and only form of acceptable external assistance in matters of national coordination.
51. **In-depth diagnostic exercises.** There is normally no dearth of good ideas or concepts at the country level, generated and discussed in the ongoing dialogue between the government, donors and UN agencies. What is lacking in many COs is the capacity to write up what has been realized and systematically follow through with proposals on the donor side.
52. Nepal, Sudan and Tajikistan offer examples of programmes where outside support has been called in to carry out a diagnostic exercise in terms of conflict analysis and prevention. These missions have led to new ways of looking at external support to

national economic and social projects, and subsequently to important adjustments in the projects themselves, even to the transformation of entire programmes. The Sudan Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for 1997-2001 for instance made no reference to the 20-year old civil war; this form of denial has now ended.

53. **Adding capacity.** In responding to the menu of potential services, the COs invariably ranked high the addition of programming and technical capacity to the field establishment. Most staff in the COs are generalists but it is not merely a matter of providing an extra pair of hands. The point was made that in order to maintain credibility with government officials, donor representatives and, at times, with competing agencies, it was vital to demonstrate expertise and familiarity with the technical issues.
54. With its focus on crisis prevention and post-conflict recovery in a limited number of countries, BCPR/TRU has by and large satisfied the COs on this score. In the best of all worlds, COs would prefer longer-term strengthening of their staff establishments; failing that, timely support to boost their ability to conduct a professional dialogue with UNDP's various partners was uniformly seen as extremely useful. It may be an intangible measure of success, but it is there; also, donor funds have been forthcoming, and missions have been useful instruments in the fund-raising process.
55. **TRU – a repository of information on recovery.** The best available information on recovery initiatives, whether on the part of the government, bilateral or multilateral agencies, exists at the national level in the COs. For BCPR focus countries, TRU could be a useful central repository of such information.
56. COs are very willing to pool this information with TRU, and from the vantage point of coordination, they see the interest in having access to information on planned an ongoing missions related to recovery interventions,. What is suggested are brief information sheets providing an overview, say at six-week intervals, of any initiatives under way or planned during the period in the area of conflict prevention and recovery. They could be compiled by the CO focal point but should not add substantially to the CO workload.

IV. POLICY GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES

1. A stated, important objective for TRU is to develop and advocate policies in the area of transition recovery. This is broadly taken to mean that the Unit should assist in the elaboration of guidelines and best practices, which systematize the UNDP experience in CPC countries.
2. Clearly, the final formulation, approval and dissemination of guidelines and best practice – if they are to have an organizational stamp of approval – go beyond the attributions of TRU and engage other divisions in BCPR and UNDP. TRU is however able to contribute with much of the groundwork in recording and reporting the practical field experience, particularly in the technical disciplines where it is building up expertise.
3. The shape and form of guidelines on issues relevant to recovery has yet to be decided. One way is to work with informal brief presentations of the experience acquired in other situations, but do not give them the status of guidelines or best practice. This is already happening, as for instance in the area of DDR. Such informal briefs can be taken a step further and issued as Technical Advisory Notes, which can regularly be updated, as has been suggested by TRU. (TANs were a regular feature of UNDP headquarters interaction with the field offices in the 1980s).

Systematising the UNDP experience

A hierarchy of briefs and guidelines:

- Short descriptions of service lines available from BCPR/TRU (1-2 pp)
- Formats describing standard procedures and checklists
- Informal technical briefs on experience in other countries (4-5 pp)
- Technical advisory notes, continuously reviewed and updated (5-6 pp)
- Substantive guidelines and best practices (max 12 pp)

While the first two categories of briefs should be routine exercises and internal to BCPR/TRU, the two latter categories should require approval by the BCPR directorate.

4. There is clearly need for flexibility in this regard, and a mix of one-page product descriptions recommended in Section II, para 16, checklists, informal briefs, technical advisory notes and more ambitious lessons learnt studies and best practice presentations is obviously desirable. Care should be taken not to misuse the “best practice” concept by qualifying technical papers and accounts of experience in other countries in this manner.

5. The mechanism for consulting, communicating and mainstreaming this mix of products fortunately already exists through the CPR Knowledge Network, being one of UNDP's six practice areas, as well as through the inter-agency CPR website whose management TRU is taking over from the World Bank. The COs consulted are already tapping into the UNDP Knowledge Network.
6. Work has already started, drawing on the UNOPS implementation record, to assemble information on the significant UNDP experience in area-based development (ABD) and in the reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), for the purpose of establishing the relevant parameters involved and preparing policy guidelines. DDR is already fairly far advanced, in that the UN system response has been vetted by an ECHA working group which reported as far back as July 2000.
7. These are two major challenges facing UNCTs in CPC situations; in particular, ABD has the singular advantage, from UNDP's perspective, of potentially embracing and providing a vehicle for all its six "practice" areas. No time should therefore be lost in finalizing and disseminating recommendations on best practice on ABD.
8. Another proposed study on the methodology that should be used to assess needs in post-conflict reconstruction is being initiated in collaboration with the World Bank. The terms of reference for the consultant study, to be jointly financed by the two organizations, is of considerable interest to TRU and will eventually produce a set of guidelines or a manual on the subject.

V. MOBILISING RESOURCES AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

1. **A strategy for fund raising.** While not always the case, partnerships normally thrive when they go hand in hand with the successful mobilization of resources. This is in the nature of things; partnerships are built on community of interest, and resource use is most often at the heart of the joint interest.
2. Thus, old partnerships are reinforced and new partnerships are born when joint programmes come into being. In general, COs believe that the most effective resource mobilization is done at the local level, and by accessing donors through local channels and representations. In CPC situations, they say, once a CO demonstrates capacity to deliver, raising funds comes naturally. COs that have built up a viable DEX mechanism are also successful in raising funds. Donors also find this route attractive because of the lower overhead charges.

3. In theory and practice, substantive support to COs by BCPR/TRU will bolster their efforts to convince donors to help fund the proposed programmes. Undoubtedly, TRU missions have had a catalytic effect on the mobilization of resources by the COs, as will be apparent from a close reading of Annex IV. In this line of thinking, it would be useful for donors to make available seed money, over and above those already at the disposal of BCPR via TRAC 113, by earmarking contributions to the Thematic Trust Fund for Service line 2, Transition Recovery, and for possible use in the context of TRU missions.
4. Even where support takes the form of preparing project documentation, submissions or participation in the subsequent monitoring, COs however generally insist resource mobilization must be field-driven. In this situation, BCPR/TRU can probably best assist the COs by providing them with periodic across-the-board analyses of the resources allocated and mobilized for crisis prevention and recovery. On occasion, this has already been done. The raw data is available with the Operations Support Unit, but needs to be processed to provide overview and insight into the ways core funds and extra-budgetary contributions are channeled and operationalised in the field. The data should be classified by source/donor, routings (thematic trust funds or local trust funds/cost-sharing), recipient country and executing arrangements (DEX, NEX, UN Agency) and draw attention to country preferences on the part of donors. The analysis should provide pointers to COs on possible new fund-raising approaches.

Donor participation in field missions

Country-based donor agencies generally welcome participation in UN needs assessment and programme formulation missions. From their vantage point, there is a flip side as participation can serve to create unwanted expectations of funding. This is however viewed as a minor problem, and such expectations are minimized when outside consultants are used.

One donor made the point that if they are to be associated with UN missions, they should be consulted at the earliest possible stage in the planning of the mission. From their perspective, lead times were short and they were not given the opportunity to comment on the terms of reference. Supporting documentation was not always made available in advance. In the specific case, there was an explanation: for reasons of its own, the Government had resisted the inclusion of donor representatives in the mission, but had finally yielded to persuasion.

5. Another way of reinforcing CO-driven resource mobilization would be to organize regular debriefing with donor agencies represented in Geneva; it is realized that it may be difficult to establish from scratch an appropriate forum – or use an existing forum – for such purposes, but a beginning could be made, jointly with UNHCR, and

the World Bank as appropriate, in presenting the results of missions dedicated to the 4 "R" process, as was recently done after the recent programming mission in Eritrea.

6. In several instances, COs have asked for BCPR/TRU support in presenting projects through the CAP or CHAP. Few COs are however sanguine about raising funds through the CAP process, and the overall record of donor response to recovery needs in 2002 can only be qualified as dismal. Prospects look better for 2003, and the CAP route for mobilizing resources is a valid one, although a significant part of the resources mobilized for recovery are in fact negotiated outside the CAP but inserted there to formalize requests that have already been approved or where a donor has given the green light. An ECHA/OCHA Working Group has recently been set up to try to find a solution to the long-standing issue of the distinctions that apply to relief and recovery concerns, as presented through the CAPs.
7. **Key partnerships.** TRU has an obvious interest in coordinating its work with that of OCHA and UNHCR, and close working links exist with these bodies at the various levels in Geneva. Invariably COs endorse the idea that UNDACs fielded by OCHA after major disasters should have a recovery specialist on the team, in addition to the disaster reduction specialist whose participation is already frequent if not routine. Two TRU recovery specialists have undergone the training offered by OCHA for prospective UNDAC assignments; except in the case of Palestine, there has so far not been any occasion to deploy them.
8. On the recovery side of the transition spectrum, two joint missions with UNCHR to Eritrea and Sri Lanka have been devoted to providing a practical demonstration of the potential for programming recovery jointly with UNHCR and of the so-called 4"R" process, in the case of Eritrea together with the World Bank, and in the case of Sri Lanka with ILO. Regular contacts are maintained with ILO which has a joint interest with TRU in DDR and in the reintegration of ex-combatants and IDPs, as well as in micro-finance; contacts are less frequent with WHO and FAO.
9. While further follow-up action is required in both cases, the existence in Geneva of interested organizational units makes for regular working contacts between UNDP and UNHCR in order to synchronize operations with the UNCTs. In both cases, the governments concerned expect major contributions from the donor community.
10. Aside from working with the World Bank on methodologies for multi-sector needs assessment in CPC countries, TRU has maintained an ongoing dialogue with Bank staff on the establishment of working relationships at the country level. These relate to the possible use of the WB Post-Conflict Fund and the implications of the Bank's initiative in favour of four pilot countries denominated LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress). Under its aegis, a poverty mapping project has been undertaken in cooperation with the WB Institute in Somalia. In Angola, work with the Bank has focused on demobilization and reintegration.

11. **Networking.** BCPR/TRU has reached out to other actors and organizations that have a strong interest in crisis prevention and post-conflict recovery. It is a member of the CPR Network, an important forum for contact with 29 other donor and implementing agencies, focusing on operational issues relating to conflict prevention, mitigation and post-conflict recovery.
12. The CPR Network has held 10 meetings, held on a semi-annual basis and hosted by a member agency. A key new element of BCPR/TRU's membership is that it has taken over responsibility for managing the CPR Network Website, earlier hosted by the World Bank. The main purpose of the Website, which is open to entries by all members, is to share information on early warning systems, training material and lessons learnt, as well as develop operational guidelines and tools, inter alia through workshops, and assessing the application of such tools.
13. **Civil society organizations.** In another major initiative, the first of its kind, TRU has been the organizing party for two regional three-day workshops with NGOs and CSOs, one held at the end of October in Nairobi with national NGO participation from 14 African countries, and the other in mid-December in Jakarta, with national NGO participation from six Asian countries. CO staff from the same countries was also in attendance, as well as a strong UNDP headquarters contingent.
14. NGOs and CSOs play an important role in CPC situations, not only by virtue of being used extensively as implementing agents in bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. The purpose of the workshops has been to identify what constitutes common ground between UNDP and NGOs in the areas of policy harmonization, operations and capacity-building. Various mechanisms to carry the process forward were examined and recommended.
15. The regional NGO workshops were consultative in character, and it is hoped that firmer commitments and decisions will be obtained in a final workshop which is presently being organized and to be held in Geneva in April 2003.
16. **The private sector.** Interaction with other UN agencies is more of an ad hoc nature and in the framework of field missions that involve the UNCTs. In Afghanistan, an interesting experiment has been initiated to involve the private sector in the recovery process. By lending its good offices as go-between, BCPR/TRU has lined up a domestic investor for a start-up pharmaceutical company producing generic drugs, sponsored and assisted by the European Generic Medicine Association through a Swiss NGO, the Business Humanitarian Forum. Should this model prove viable, it is likely to be replicated in other sectors.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Support to Country Offices.** A key function of BCPR/TRU is to help translate abstract concepts like recovery, conflict prevention, peace-building into operational programmes at the country level. This is the essential meaning of TRU's support to COs, tackling a broad agenda that in some instances contribute to revamping entire country programmes, once they are looked at from the perspective of an incipient or protracted civil conflict.
2. The BCPR strategy of concentrating human and financial resources on a limited number of focus countries has paid off handsomely. In the COs in these countries, there is considerable and uniform appreciation of the role played by BCPR and its constituent units, including TRU, in terms of responsiveness, timeliness and value added to their national programmes. In the words of one Resident Coordinator, with long-time experience of UNDP, the performance of BCPR and TRU has been nothing short of "remarkable". This positive judgment is echoed by UNDP's regional bureaus.
3. In two countries, Sudan and Nepal, the COs believe that their interaction with BCPR/TRU had profoundly influenced and transformed their country programmes, as well as attitudes prevailing within government departments, from a state of ignoring or denying the impact of conflict on society, to one of awareness of its causes and readiness to make adjustments. This is no mean achievement.
4. In volume terms, on the part of TRU – some 30 missions by individual senior TRU staff – field assignments may have detracted from the normative parts of TRU's Work Plan devoted to the elaboration of guidelines and best practices. Understandably, there has been a need to build up a body of experience in the first year of operations. As a result however work on systematizing the UNDP experience has fallen behind target.
5. **A switch of emphasis.** During its first year of operations, field assignments by TRU staff have tended to dominate the overall allocation of time to the different tasks, to the detriment of other objectives. The interviews with the COs show at the same time that there is an unsatisfied requirement for policy guidance.
6. To redress the balance, TRU will need to rely more on consultants, and urgently complete work on a roster making up a core group of specialists who can be fielded regularly by TRU. Outsourcing specific mission tasks to sister UN agencies – even when joint or inter-agency missions are not involved – could also be done routinely. The roster should furthermore include consultants who are known to donor agencies from earlier work. Budget adjustments will no doubt be necessary to accommodate such an increase in the use of consultants.

7. **Service lines and products.** The switch of emphasis should also apply to service products. It is argued in Section II, (paras 12-17) that the conventional logframe analysis would in future not be an optimal management tool for an organizational entity, whose vocation is that of a service provider. Rather, emphasis should be placed on the products TRU is set up to provide, and work should start at an early date to reach in-house agreement on the definition of these products.
8. In this context care should be taken not to confuse the generic product with its specific content which will vary from country to country and which cannot be prescribed in advance. Expressed differently, a regional multi-sector recovery framework (the service product) may find area-based development advantageous or recommend a different approach (content).
9. Greater emphasis on service products offer a new basis for the way BCPR/TRU markets its services, deploys its existing human resources and builds up its capacities over the longer haul. Some service lines will be in high demand, others will be called on less frequently. There is no better method of tailoring supply to demand.
10. As an evolving but potentially important service product, the Transition Recovery Team (TRT) concept should finally be defined (Section II, paras 18-24). Though not described as TRTs, several multi-agency missions have in fact already taken place, producing integrated recovery frameworks and providing a measure of experience on which to better define the purpose and context of TRT missions. If a TRT is to produce an integrated recovery framework crossing sector lines, it clearly has to relate strongly to the UNCT as a whole and seen to be working on behalf of the UN system. This approach would not in any way diminish the potential role that UNDP can play.
11. **Policy guidelines and best practice.** The development and advocacy of specific policies in the area of transition recovery is an important item in the TRU Work Plan. Now that TRU has been in operation for more than a year, it is time to give greater attention to systemizing and mainstreaming the experience UNDP has acquired in this area.
12. As suggested in Section IV, an appropriate mix of products should be considered, ranging from short descriptions of TRU service lines, checklists, informal technical briefs and advisory notes to full-fledged presentations of best practice that have been vetted by other stakeholders and approved by the BCPR directorate.
13. In particular, work has been under way on the elaboration of best practice in area-based development (ABD), and no time should be lost in completing this exercise. As an approach to transition problems of recovery and development, ABD appears to have everything to go for it and to be of singular strategic interest to UNDP: it embeds or can be made to embed all its six practice areas, it is multi-sectoral, yet flexible and adaptable to individual situations; and it tackles needs at grass-root level.

14. To advance the preparation of guidelines, it is suggested that senior staff members who have been given watching briefs in specific technical areas should submit plans for how they propose to carry out this element of their job descriptions. A ready mechanism for mainstreaming guidelines and policies already exists through the CPR Knowledge Network and for communicating with the users in the COs. This should be exploited to the full.
15. As part of its work to familiarize CO staff and implementing partners with the work of UNDP, BCPR and TRU in transition recovery, a handbook for programming in CPC situations has been under preparation for the best part of a year. Considerable work has gone into the production of this document, and every effort should be made to bring the enterprise to a conclusion.
16. **Resource mobilization.** The considerations presented in Section V point to a BCPR/TRU resource mobilization strategy that upholds the primacy of the CO role. Apart from core resources, donors have two avenues for funding UNDP projects, one through the central UNDP Thematic Trust Fund managed by BCPR, and second, directly to the CO using trust fund or cost-sharing mechanisms. This is so whether or not the programmes have been entered into CAPs, often with TRU assistance, or mobilized differently.
17. Support for country-driven fund raising can take several forms. In addition to assisting with programme formulation and specific project submissions, it would be appropriate to:
- Provide all COs with an analysis of the various resource mobilization options available, based on the record to date, as outlined in Section V, para 4 above;
 - Develop, at headquarters level, Geneva, a donor forum for presenting salient funding prospects that arise in conjunction with TRU missions. Initially, this method of acquainting donors with upcoming recovery programmes should be applied to the debriefing of missions undertaken as part of the 4”R” process where often large amounts are involved, as done in the case of Eritrea.
18. Such a strategy does not detract from the usefulness of the Thematic Trust Fund, which may give BCPR more leeway in making programme allocations and in leveraging core resources. Several COs were pleased with the workings of the Thematic Fund and saw it as a flexible instrument for mobilizing resources. Consideration should also be given to asking donors to earmark contributions to the Thematic Fund for use in the context of Transition Recovery, within Service line 2 of the Fund, as suggested in Section V, para 3.

19. **Building partnerships.** The cultivation of existing and new partnerships, as described in Section V, is on course. Built as they are on community of interest, most often in the context of resource use, they tend to come alive when joint programmes are undertaken, and relapse into a dormant state when there is no such prospect. The BCPR/TRU link-up with the inter-agency CPR Network needs to be sustained to be productive; the initiatives taken to form closer links with the universe of national NGOs are likewise part of a longer-term commitment.
20. Two exercises have been carried out by UNHCR and UNDP, in Eritrea and Sri Lanka, to pilot a programming model in accordance with the 4”R” or Brookings process. Time will eventually show whether this approach is effective. In terms of the “4R”, the experience of B&H appears very relevant to the process and deserves to be investigated. While not officially a test case in this context, the significant resources acquired and expended since 1996 for area-based reintegration and recovery, totaling USD 57 mn, should provide good clues as to their efficacy, in terms of solving transition problems and narrowing the funding gap for recovery activities.
21. In the case of OCHA, COs uniformly subscribe to arrangements providing for the participation of a recovery specialist from TRU in UNDACS fielded by OCHA. An agreement already exists regarding TRU participation in UNDACS, but has only been applied once. A second MOU has been prepared to define the interface between TRT and UNDACS teams and is now ready for signature, setting the stage for operationalising a major service product of BCPR/TRU.

SUGGESTED SPECIFIC ACTION POINTS

The main recommendations are summarized in the following action points:

- Prepare brief descriptions (1-2 pages) of the various service products that TRU can provide in the context of transition recovery (Section II, sub-section ii);
- As part of the above, prepare a draft definition of the TRTs, providing greater precision as to their purpose and under what circumstances TRTs should be fielded (Section II, sub-section iii);
- Ask TRU senior field advisers/recovery specialists to submit individual plans/time-tables for the elaboration of technical briefs (for instance, salient features of experience in other countries) technical advisory notes and guidelines, to be fed into the CPR Knowledge Networking (Section IV and Section II, sub-section iv);

- With respect to the possible effectiveness of the 4 “R” approach, investigate the lessons learned in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The views of the Resident Coordinator should be sought, before the matter is raised with the BCPR Directorate (Section III, para 31);
- Develop a draft “best practice“ paper on area-based rehabilitation/development for submission to the BCPR Directorate (Section IV, para 7);
- Urgently finalize the consultant roster (Section II, sub-section iv);
- In support of country-level fund raising:
 - a) prepare periodic overviews and analyses of resources mobilized and allocated for crisis prevention and recovery;
 - b) establish a practical formula or forum for debriefing interested donors represented in Geneva regarding missions resulting in significant proposals/programmes;
- Prepare a draft information sheet providing summary details of any initiative under way or planned in regard to crisis prevention and recovery and circulate to COs for comments and feasibility (Section III, sub-section ii, paras 55-56).

UN SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND RECOVERY IN NEPAL

The National Context

Across Nepal, the announcement at the end of January of a cease-fire between government forces and the Maoist insurgents have raised new hopes of an end to the escalating violence that has claimed over 7.000 lives and wrought devastation in rural districts and villages. Three weeks later, the cease fire is holding; there have been no major breaches of the truce, the political dialogue between erstwhile adversaries is opening up, and there has been a noticeable easing in the freedom of movement within districts and regions, even in the most affected areas of the mid-west and far-west.

Without prejudging the outcome of the political negotiations, this is a situation where the Government of Nepal and the international donor community believe there is a clear case for supporting the peace process and the prospective reform of political institutions, by launching an early programme of rehabilitation and recovery, starting in the most exposed regions. Even at the risk of a possible relapse into conflict, there is general agreement that the present opportunity must be seized.

Through the confidence-building measures that such a programme could bring about, the affected populations, villagers and Maoists alike, will see a practical demonstration of the Government's concern for their predicament and suffering, as well as a renewed will on the part of the authorities to take action on behalf of the poor and most disadvantaged in society. In short, concrete action can show that there is a real dividend associated with non-violence and peace.

Preconditions for success

For such a recovery programme to have immediate and visible impact, the following conditions will have to be met:

- Support for recovery must reach down to the basic levels of rural society, operating in the village setting, where people have suffered the most;
- The programme must be truly participatory, and a serious effort should be made to apply the lessons learnt in such programmes as the Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP), the Micro-Enterprise Development Programme (MEDEP) and the Rural Energy Development Programme (REDP);
- Projects identified and implemented must be seen to reflect the genuine wish of the people, who will need to be directly consulted through established community groupings such as user groups, youth groups, religious and political groups, including professed Maoists;

- Flexible implementation arrangements must be adopted to ensure that the flow of resources to the district and village level is not slowed down by red tape or formal procedures of Government budget allocation.

A Plan for Immediate Action

Needs Assessment Mission. In charting the best way forward, the Government will need to consider asking the international community to join it in an initiative seen to support the peace-building process, and inviting the UN system agencies and countries having bilateral aid programmes in Nepal to be associated with it in launching an immediate programme of rehabilitation in the most affected areas of the country.

As a first step, the Government should consider inviting the UN Resident Coordinator to assemble a Needs Assessment Mission that would include representatives of the UN system agencies and the donor community. The Mission should be tasked with assessing the most urgent requirements, inventorising humanitarian as well as rehabilitation needs.

It should also be tasked with instituting an ongoing process of needs identification, programming and implementation to ensure that the programme is sustained over a period that can not now be determined, but that should run until a final political settlement is assured. The programme could accordingly remain operational from an estimated six to eighteen months.

Mechanisms for local consultation. In the absence of locally elected district and village development committees, which are likely to remain non-functional until new local government elections are held, it will be necessary to institute temporary and ad hoc mechanisms for programme consultation at the local level, for the purpose of identifying, approving and monitoring projects of immediate interest to the communities.

Without such mechanisms, the sense of local ownership will in most cases be absent. As recommended by the Government, they should be as inclusive as possible and able to reflect the consensus of programme beneficiaries with respect to the selection of projects. Mechanisms of this kind can take the form of a relatively open “forum”, to which the various stakeholder groups should be invited, representatives of political parties including the Maoists, line agencies, civil society organizations, NGOs, user groups, etc. In other words, there should be no rigid requirements for participation in the forum, nor in terms of levels of representation.

Their designation as “fora” is suggested to differentiate such mechanisms from the earlier locally elected bodies and to devise a formula of consultation able to capture the consensus and freely expressed views of those taking part. They could be instituted at the district level, as the “District Development Forum”, and be convened by the Local Development Officer. The official machinery under the LDO could serve as the secretariat for the Forum to ensure that decisions taken are complied with.

Such ad hoc mechanisms could then be replicated at the village level and called “Village Development Forum”, convened by the Village Development Officer, and with as broad participation of all stakeholders as possible, again with the Maoists represented.

Interim programming arrangements. Such temporary mechanisms for local consultation cannot be created overnight. To begin with, they will require further policy review on the part of the Government and negotiation with the Maoist leadership. In the end, different arrangements for local consultation may be preferred and put in place. Meanwhile, interim solutions will have to be adopted to advance the rehabilitation and recovery programme, based on direct and frequent contact with user and other groups. If at all feasible, programme staff of UN agencies, working with Government staff, should consult with Maoist leaders at village and district level along with user groups to ensure that they are committed to the rehabilitation projects selected.

First attention will have to be given by the Needs Assessment Mission to the humanitarian needs of internally displaced people (IDP), to victims of past violence and other vulnerable groups.

Substantial rehabilitation needs have arisen as a result of the extensive destruction of community assets, such as suspension bridges, micro-hydro plants and electric transmission lines, school buildings, post offices, and health posts; other assets have fallen into disrepair and require overdue maintenance.

It is reported that over 2,000 village development offices, country-wide, have been gutted, and all records and documents destroyed. Where the district development office has also been attacked, there is little information available centrally on the current situation of the village or on earlier development work there. The dearth of data, in many cases, underlines the need for the Assessment Mission to set up a viable system of ongoing consultation with government officers and civil society groups at the village level.

The Needs Assessment Mission should also give special attention to projects that were approved by the earlier elected bodies under the decentralized programming formula, but that have not been implemented for lack of funds or because of security considerations.

Taking into account ongoing activities already pursued in the selected areas by WFP and UNICEF, as well as by bilaterally funded NGOs, a recovery programme package could comprise:

- Unfunded projects categorized as Priority 2 and Priority 3 projects under the decentralized programming; these projects should be reviewed in terms of their present relevance in consultation with the appropriate stakeholders at district and village level;
- Projects targeting marginalized groups, orphans and victims of violence. The situation of IDPs should be carefully reviewed as many IDPs have access to adequate resources on their own. Some 30,000 persons are reported to have

been displaced, with 6,000 residing in camps. Targeted support is needed in some cases and to strengthen the support capacities of host communities.

- Rehabilitation projects yielding quick and visible results. In general these would consist of repair to infrastructure, using labour-intensive methods, and the rebuilding of destroyed community assets that provide collective benefits (communal buildings, irrigation and drainage canals, water supply and sanitation, improvement of feeder roads, etc),
- Strengthening existing micro-credit programmes, by upgrading vocational and business skills, targeting youth and women, particularly those from ethnic groups and lower castes.
- A shelf of relevant and likely projects which could be implemented within UNDPs existing national programmes, such as MEDEP, REDP and the Village Development programme, are suggested in the Appendix. Given financial resources, these could be quickly implemented to realize the peace dividend leveraging existing UNDP capacity. Similar portfolios could be combined by other agencies like WFP/ UNICEF/ ILO.

Focus areas. The areas having suffered the heaviest disruptions of their development in the past six years are situated in the mid-west and far-west. The rehabilitation and recovery programme should therefore direct the bulk of its efforts to these regions. The districts of Ropal and Rukum are clearly candidates for inclusion in the programme. Administrative or geographical boundaries are not the only criteria; population and village densities as well as access are important considerations. The Needs Assessment Mission will need to make a final determination as to which areas should be included in the programme.

Implementation. The Needs Assessment Mission will furthermore have to devise instrumentalities for implementation and secure a flow of funds that minimize any delays in project benefits reaching the beneficiaries. Many projects are fairly straightforward interventions needing primarily organizational and procurement inputs; other projects will be more complicated, having technical components where outside engineering capacity must be sought and provided.

To the maximum extent possible, the communities themselves and various user groups should control project implementation, including the organization of labour inputs as appropriate. A strong community role in the implementation of a project will strengthen local ownership in the interest of sustainable results

With respect to fund disbursement, UNDP is in a position to take advantage of the organizational infrastructure built up through the PDDP, which should enable those charged with project implementation at district and village levels to obtain early access to funds. Where a national NGO is the implementing agent, it should be possible to effect direct payments from the multi-donor Peace and Development Trust Fund. Whichever funding channel is used, local disbursement decisions should be coordinated by a District or Village Development Forum, as outlined above.

The Wider Perspective

Area-based development. An emergency recovery programme limited to the districts hardest hit by the Maoist insurgency should be perceived as part of a longer term strategy of peace-building and development. Two assumptions need to be made, a) that the current political negotiations are in time successfully concluded, and b) that local elections are held under a new political dispensation that confronts the present exclusion of large segments of Nepali society.

In this event, the proposed recovery programme could evolve into an area-based development scheme building on the experience made, examining in greater depth the root causes of the conflict and widening the scope for social and economic change.

Area-based development programmes are increasingly favoured as a multi-sector and multi-actor instrument to introduce new approaches to development, offering useful testing-grounds for enacting decentralization policies, for empowering regional and local councils, and for fiscal transfers from the centre to the regions.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). The Government is considering extending an offer of cantonment to the Maoists that would target the following categories:

- Attract hard core militants bearing arms and estimated to number about 5000, who will be closely watching any concessions made to satisfy their aspirations as the peace process proceeds;
- Address the specific needs of some 17000 Maoist supporters who do not bear arms and who have surrendered to the Government, but may turn restless and frustrated, as they have lost their original livelihoods and not benefited from any rehabilitation programme.

A separate note delineates the recommended DDR process which should be dovetailed with the longer term recovery programme. The DDR process should lead to harnessing conditions for social and economic stability by creating an environment conducive to reconciliation and peace-building.

The DDR process would have to move through a sequence of i) provision of immediate safety net/subsistence package to Maoists bearing arms, ii) registration and socio-economic profiling of former combatants, iii) vocational training, iv) a comprehensive reintegration package, dovetailing into the larger community-based recovery programme, special care being taken however to avoid any special treatment of ex-combatants as opposed to other conflict affected groups. Psycho-social counseling and the particular needs of handicapped former combatants should be considered.

Commission for the reintegration of ex-combatants. Experience elsewhere shows that the establishment of a dedicated institutional mechanism, such as a special commission, is needed in situations where the business at hand engages not only the former adversary but the responsibilities of several government agencies. The

commission should be given sufficient autonomy and a balanced representation across conflict lines to see the process through to its conclusion. The exact contours of the DDR framework can only be worked out as the peace negotiations reach a more advanced stage. Until then, a subsistence package for ex-combatants will need to be considered so that there is no relapse into localized conflict and banditry.

National recovery and development framework. Again, assuming good progress is made in the political negotiations, it will be necessary - given Nepal's heavy reliance on external support for its development budget - to conduct a multi-sector assessment of recovery and development needs that should be accommodated with the advent of peace.

Through the accompanying analysis, such a needs assessment and the resultant recovery and development framework must identify and seek to remedy the conditions that were at the source of violent conflict. Nation-wide in scope the framework could be the basis for a negotiated protocol and part of the final peace agreement. But irrespective of its potential role in helping cement a political settlement, it will have wider development significance if made a supplement to the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and functionally linked to UNDP's monitoring of national progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

As such, the recovery and development framework can be fed into the Consultative Group process and serve to underpin the quest for the substantial aid resources to Nepal that will be called for when the political unrest of the past six years is history.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL RECOVERY UNIT,
BCPR/UNDP
22 January 2003 – 4 March 2003

A. Introduction:

The Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery (BCPR) is UNDP's in-house mechanism set up to provide a quicker and more effective response of the UNDP's Country Offices in crisis and post-conflict situations.

Within BCPR, the Transition Recovery Unit (TRU), based in Geneva, is responsible for supporting the Country Offices, upon their request, through the provision of technical advise, strategy and policy recommendations, program design and monitoring/evaluation services. These activities are usually backed by a limited amount of seed-funds from TRAC 3 resources. TRU support covers *inter alia* the following areas;

- Assessment of transition and recovery needs following a crisis
- Resettlement and reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs
- Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants
- Area based development
- Economic revitalization.
- Supporting recovery capacities of communities and local authorities
- Forging partnerships with stakeholders

In order to do this effectively, and in line with the current demand for UNDP to move more upstream, the TRU consistently builds on its in-house capacity as a centre of knowledge and expertise for transition recovery related issues. It focuses hereby on:

- Promotion and mainstreaming of the transition recovery policies and approach into UNDP.
- Systematisation of transition recovery experiences and advocating good practice
- Forging and strengthening of partnerships with a wide network of other UN agencies, donors, local governments, multilateral institutions, NGO's and the private sector
- Effective resource mobilisation and allocation.

The BCPR was established in November 2001 while the TRU in its current set-up gradually emerged afterward. The unit has steadily built up its operational and knowledge capacity and delivered a wide range of services to the CO's in a number of selected countries (see E below). TRU support takes shape primarily through fielding Transitional Recovery Teams, Senior Field Advisors and backstopping.

However, since BCPR - and hence also TRU - support to a CO is of a limited duration, it is the CO in question that holds final responsibility for BCPR-sponsored program implementation and results in the field.

B. Objectives of the TRU:

To strengthen UNDP's capacity to contribute to economic revitalization in CPC countries as a means to transition

To enable UNDP to facilitate capacity building at the community level to ensure access to social services and to foster reconciliation

To promote coordination in support of the transition process

To strengthen UNDP country office and UN Resident Coordinator system capacity to initiate appropriate and timely support to early recovery efforts: closing the "gap" between relief assistance and development cooperation in post-conflict and post-disaster situations

C. The Evaluation:

In order to assess the quality and appropriateness of input, the TRU plans to undertake an external and independent evaluation of its functioning, the result of which will be for internal use only.

The period this evaluation covers will be November 2001 to December 2002. With such a relatively short period of coverage, it is difficult to measure outcome of the support provided. Since this is an exercise for internal use only, focus will be made on measuring output rather than outcome. For lessons learning purposes, the evaluation will cover support provided prior to COs prior to November 2001 under a different arrangement. Since the unit has functions that contribute to effective support at the CO level and above, the focus will therefore not remain limited to assessment at the CO level.

D. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess:

The extent to which the TRU has made progress achieving above mentioned 4 objectives. The extent to which the unit is moving on track towards achieving the above mentioned objectives fully.

The degree and appropriateness of support provided to the UNDP COs through the fielded advisors.

Units' achievements in the field of fund mobilisation for recovery projects/programmes.

The role-played in initiating and strengthening of partnership.

E. Geographical focus of Evaluation:

In order to provide effective support to COs in time of need and to have measurable achievements in crisis prevention and recovery, BCPR decided to focus on the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Eritrea, Nepal, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, DRC and Tajikistan.

The Evaluation Mission is expected to focus their assessment on all countries but visit at least two to be selected based on an initial discussions with the evaluation mission and COs.

F. Issues to be addressed by the Evaluations

The Evaluation Mission will focus on the following issues:

- To undertake an assessment of the CO capacity before and after the crisis with a view of assessing the added value of the TRU field advisors to fill the capacity gaps.
- The extents of the COs awareness and commitment to the Transitional Recovery processes, the role of the Transitional Recovery Unit in recovery processes.
- Analysis of the extents to which the support provided by the TRU and its field advisors was appropriate to the need of the CO at the time.
- Assess the role of the TRU Field advisors in resource mobilization and promotion of partnership.

G. Products Expected from the Evaluation

The product would include a comprehensive report with a clear statement of findings, lessons learnt, and recommendations for improvement.

H. Methodology

The evaluation mission is expected to extensively interact with the key and appropriate players in the focused COs selected for this exercise applying one or more of the following means:

To, where applicable see if the TRU input has reflected in the SRF and ROAR

To visit minimum **four** of the selected CO's for not more than one week each.

To undertake teleconferences involving relevant authorities at the CO and HQ as appropriate.

To extensively rely on emails

To consider sending out questionnaires to those who cannot be reached by other means.

I. Implementation Arrangements:

An evaluation mission is to be identified by the TRU Geneva. It is strongly recommended that a credible independent team with the right expertise be hired to undertake the task. Preference should however, be given to candidates familiar with UNDP and its functions. The TRU Team Leader will lead the over all interaction with the mission, however Umer

Daudzai a TRU member will remain as focal point for logistical and professional back up.

Upon finalization of the TOR, invitations would be extended to relevant groups companies to bid for the task and to send CVs of their candidates.

The candidates would be expected to submit to the focal point a one page summary of their proposed strategy that would serve among other factors as mean for selection of the mission members.

H. Timing:

The proposed duration of the evaluation is fro 30 working days within the period of 15 January 2003 to 25 February 2003.

ANNEX II**List of Persons Consulted¹****UNDP:**

Ameerah Haq, Deputy Director, BCPR, New York
 Georg Charpentier, Deputy Director, BCPR, Geneva
 Sam Barnes, Chief, Strategic Planning Unit
 Marie Dimond, Strategic Planning Unit

Sally Fegan-Wyles, Director, UN Development Group Office

Jean-Claude Rogivue, Bureau for Asia and the Pacific
 Tegegnetwork Gettu, Bureau for Africa
 Andrew Russell, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
 Gulden Turkoz-Cosslett, Bureau for Europe and the CIS

Andrew Maskrey, Team Leader, Disaster Reduction & Recovery Unit
 Robert Scharf, Chief, Small Arms and Demobilization Unit
 Sergio Valdini, Coordinator, Operations Support

Boubou Camara, Deputy Resident Representative, Angola
 Anne-Marie Cluckers, Resident Representative a.i., Sudan
 Matthew Kahane, Resident Coordinator, Tajikistan
 Steve Kinloch, Programme Officer, Angola
 Andre Klap, Deputy Resident Representative, Indonesia
 Herbert Mcleod, Resident Coordinator, DRC
 Ercan Murat, Country Director, Afghanistan
 Knut Ostby, Deputy Resident Representative, Afghanistan
 Miguel Vermeo, Resident Coordinator, Sri Lanka

Other UN Organizations (Headquarters):

Ross Mountain, Deputy Director, OCHA/Geneva
 Klaus Wiersing, Chief, Policy Development Section, OCHA
 John Rogge, Senior Adviser, IDP Network, OCHA
 David Lambo, Director, Africa Division, UNHCR
 Sajjad Malik, Reintegration and Local Settlement Section, UNHCR
 Christophe Bouvier, Division Chief, RESS, UNOPS
 J. Krishnamurty, Senior Economist, Crisis Response and Reconstruction, ILO
 Alessandro Loretto, Dept of Emergency and Humanitarian Action, WHO

¹) Excludes staff of the Transition Recovery Unit

Eritrea:**UN Agencies**

Somon Nhongo, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
 Firouz Sobhani, Senior Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
 Techeste Ahderom, Senior Adviser on Recovery, UNDP
 Marino Martin, Programme Coordinator

Musa Bungudu, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA

Tahir Ali, Chief of Mission, UNHCR

Patrick Buckley, Representative and Country Director, WFP

Embassies

Hans Fredrik Lehne, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Norwegian Embassy
 Govert Visser, Deputy Head of Mission, Netherlands Embassy

Government

Teclmichael W.Giorgis Rosso, Deputy Commissioner, Eritrean Relief and Refugee
 Commission
 Kidane Tseggai, Director General, Ministry of Local Government

Bosnia/Herzegovina:**UN Agencies**

Henrik Kolstrup, Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative. UNDP
 Moises Venancio, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
 Goran Vukmir, Portfolio Manager, Area-Based Development, UNDP
 Seid Turkovic, Portfolio Manager, Mine Action and Capacity-building
 Yves van Frausum, Programme Manager, Srebrenica RR Programme

Udo Janz, Acting Chief of Mission, UNHCR

John Farvolden, Assistant Chief of Mission (Operations), UNHCR

Embassies

Per Iwansson, Aid Attaché, Swedish Embassy
 Leila Fetahagic, Programme Manager, Netherlands Embassy

Government

Mario Nenadic, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees

Nepal:**UN agencies**

Henning Karcher, Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative
Alessandra Tisot, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Anil K.C., Programme Officer, UNDP

Erika Joergensen, WFP Representative and Country Director
UN Country Team, Task Force on Needs Assessment

Embassies

Ase Seim, Charge d'Affaires, Norwegian Embassy
Keith Bloomfield, Ambassador, British Embassy
Mark Segal, Adviser, DFID, British Embassy
Anton Hagen, Counsellor, Swiss Development Corporation

Government

Narayan Singh Pun, Minister, Physical Planning and Works
Shankar Sharma, Vice-Chairman, National Planning Commission
Khemraj Nepal, Secretary, Ministry of Local Development
Krishan Prasad Jaisi, Chairman, District Development Committee, Achham

Non-Governmental Organizations

Arjun Karki, President, Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN)

ANNEX III

**List of questions sent to Country Offices
on transition recovery issues**

1. What specific event or new element in the country's situation led the CO to request assistance from the BCPR/Transition Recovery Unit?
2. Did the request originate from the CO and it prepared the TOR, or was the request the result of a TRU initiative? If a TRU initiative, was the CO in a position to comment on the mission's draft TOR?
3. In what way was the government and donor involved or made party to the process?
4. Was the need to ask for TRU support discussed with the UNCT and the decision to do so made in your capacity as ResCord, or did you feel this was mostly a UNDP matter?
5. Did financing of the mission present a problem? Was funding provided through TRAC 113 or were other funds involved?
6. Is there within the CO any officer with expertise or extensive prior experience in transition issues and able to act as a focal point? Has the UNCT established a focal group for transition and recovery issues?
7. For what duration was support provided? Was it adequate, timely and effective?
8. Has there been any follow-up and results of the TRU mission, thus far?
9. In what way(s) was the TRU mission instrumental in generating donor interest in transition programmes as a whole or in a particular recovery project?
10. In what way(s) was the TRU mission instrumental in strengthening old partnerships with other agencies and NGOs, or in developing new partnerships. In what way was the partner's or partners' interest served by the TRU mission? Please provide concrete examples.
11. Do you have adequate information on what kind of services TRU can provide?
12. How would you rank, in your specific situation, the needs of the CO/UNCT in relation to transition programmes, if seen to fall in the following admittedly overlapping categories:
 - Assessment of needs
 - Elaboration of recovery framework

- Coordination support
 - Provision of guidelines on recovery issues
 - Formulation of specific programmes/projects
 - Training of CT members/government officials
 - Support for resource mobilization
 - Temporary strengthening of CO to perform most if not all of the above
13. Are you familiar with the concept of the Transition Recovery Teams (TRT) as a device to provide recovery support services from TRU?
14. If an UNDAC is fielded after a natural disaster, should it include a TR specialist?
15. Given the resource mobilization mechanisms currently available to you, which is in your view the preferred method?
16. As Rescord, the CO is the repository of valuable information on all recovery-related missions and programmes. Are ready to share such information with TRU which is mandated to do the groundwork on systematizing the UNDP experience and best practice in this programme area
17. Any other lessons learnt from the provision of TRU support; if at all, is there anything you would wish to change?

Donor Matrix UNDP BCPR Recovery Unit – Prospective Contributions and Needs in 2003

Annex 4

	Current or former main donors	Field- or HQ-level	Funding received or expected (in US\$)	From whom	Section/ Programme
Afghanistan		CO	Not specified		DDR
	Italy, Canada (CIDA), UK (DFID), Malaysia	CO (key contacts), HQ	10,000 000 9,500 000	Italy 7,500 000, Malaysia 500, 000, UK (DFID) 1,500 000, Canada (CIDA)	ABD ABD Rural govt. capacity building
	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	150,000		Rehabilitation of women's dorms in Kabul
Afghanistan (Nahreen)	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	50,000 100,000		Nat. Disaster Resp. & Prev. Local Gov. Capacity
Angola	Norway, UNDP Track 1.1.3	CO HQ	350,000 250,000	Norway UNDP	Recovery advisor & CO capacity recovery
Burundi	Worldbank (MDRP)	HQ	5,000 000	Worldbank (MDRP)	DDR
DRC/Great Lakes	Japan, France, Worldbank (MDRP), Belgium	HQ	2,500 000 6,000 000	France 1,000 000 Belgium 1,500 000 Japan 1,000 000 World Bank 5,000 000	DDR
Eritrea	Italy	CO?	2,000 000	Italy	PoWER 2
Indonesia	Netherlands, New Zealand UK (DFID)	CO?	16,000 000	Netherlands, New Zealand UK (DFID)	Community Recovery IDPs

	Current or former main donors	Field- or HQ-level	Funding received or expected (in US\$)	From whom	Section/ Programme
Liberia	European Commission, UK (DFID)*, US	HQ	Not specified		
Nepal	Germany, Swiss Development Corporation, UK (DFID)	HQ	500,000	Germany	LGSP, Needs Assessment
	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	150,000	UNDP	Peacebuilding
Sierra Leone	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	800,000	UNDP	Reintegration
Sri Lanka	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	500,000 (May 2002)	UNDP	
	Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK (DFID)	HQ	1,800 000	Denmark 100,000 Italy 200,000 Netherlands 200,000 UK (DFID) 800,000 Norwegian TTF 500,000 (November 2002)	UNDP Surge capacity Reintegration, IDPs, capacity building Economic Recovery
Sudan	UNDP Track 1.1.3	HQ	80, 000 (allocated in 2002) 5, 000		DDR, CAP
<p>(MDPR: Multicountrz Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme) (LGSP: Local Governance Strengthening Programme) *DFID's involvement in Liberia is currently centered on humanitarian programmes</p>					